



# ***Daily Report***

## **Sub-Saharan Africa**

FBIS-AFR-91-178  
Friday  
13 September 1991

# Daily Report

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## Cameroon

### Cameroon Democratic Union Officially Launched

AB1109130091 Yaounde CRTV Radio Network  
in English 1800 GMT 9 Sep 91

[Text] The national chairman of the Cameroon Democratic Union [CDU], Dr. Adamou Ndam Njoya, has officially launched his party in the Northwest Province. Devine Tchou Kong is on the line with detailed reports:

[Begin recording] The national chairman of the Cameroon Democratic Union, Dr. Adamou Ndam Njoya, has officially launched his party in the Northwest Province. The ceremony, witnessed by huge enthusiastic crowds of activists and supporters, took place on Sunday, 8 September at Bamenda municipal stadium.

In his address, the CDU party leader, Dr. Adamou Ndam Njoya, stressed that where democracy evolves on the rule of the majority, the rights of the minority must always be respected. He said what he sees as the malaise in the (?English speaking part of the country) and other national [words indistinct], are of concern to CDU. Dr. Adamou Ndam Njoya explained that his party believed in (?decentralization), including a [words indistinct] government.

The CDU national chairman paid glowing tribute to the Northwest Province which he said has produced [words indistinct] who had made enormous contributions to the national character of Cameroon. In [word indistinct] reference to the need for action rather than political demagoguery, Dr. Adamou Ndam Njoya said the time to tell the people what they want to hear is over; it is now [word indistinct] the time to tell them what they need.

(?In his) welcome address, the CDU Northwest provincial chairman, Dr. (Nguja NGatiote), emphasized the people's need for projects ranging from road construction to the creation of a full-fledged university in [name indistinct]. He expressed confidence in the ability of the CDU leadership to (?combat) such tendencies as [word indistinct] and corruption. Traditional dances (?marked) the ceremony that culminated in a march in the city center, [words indistinct] Liberty Square. [end recording]

## Rwanda

### Plane Shot 10 Sep; 1 Injured, Aircraft Damaged

EA1009200991 Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale  
de la Republique Rwandaise in French 1800 GMT  
10 Sep 91

[Text] According to a statement from the Transport and Communications Ministry, today a Fokker-27-type aircraft belonging to the Zairian Civil Aviation Company, (CIBE)-Zaire, was flying from Kigali International Airport with 13 passengers on board and taking off at 0907 for Beni in Zaire. Manasse reports:

[Manasse] The plane safely crossed the limits of Rwandan airspace at 0920 and was scheduled to reach Beni 30 minutes later. A few minutes later, the plane (?contacted) the Kigali control tower to say that it was not proceeding with its journey and was being forced to make an emergency landing at the nearest airport after being hit by shots while in the air. Goma [in Zaire] Airport was chosen as the relief airport and the plane landed at 0945, Kigali time.

After the landing, it was noted that one of the passengers was seriously injured and the aircraft heavily damaged. Preliminary investigations have just proved that the barbaric act which occurred in Ugandan airspace was orchestrated by the inyenzi-inkotanyi [rebel-cockroaches] based in Uganda.

The Rwandan Government deplores such acts, which are contrary to our states' agreements regarding civil and international air transport, and launches a strong appeal to both regional and international opinion to publicly condemn such acts.

### Habyarimana Returns, Comments on Summit Outcome

EA0909172691 Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale  
de la Republique Rwandaise in French 1800 GMT  
8 Sep 91

[Excerpts] President Juvenal Habyarimana returned home this afternoon from Gbadolite, Zaire, where he took part in the regional summit on the Rwandan conflict. [passage omitted]

Before leaving Gbadolite, President Habyarimana gave a joint news conference with President Mobutu during which President Habyarimana expressed his satisfaction at the results of the Gbadolite Summit. Here he is:

[Begin Habyarimana recording] I have a personal feeling that I believe I share with several of those who were (?at Gbadolite) yesterday: The discussions were held in an atmosphere of determination to find a solution, as there was goodwill there. We believe that we are pointed in the right direction toward a lasting solution. The discussions were sincere, without any polemics, and we think that the conclusions reached will allow us to move further toward the desired solution. [end recording] [passage omitted]

President Mobutu, the mediator between the two conflicting parties, expressed his optimism about the success of the discussions.

### Foreign Minister Briefs Envoys on Gbadolite Talks

EA1109191091 Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale  
de la Republique Rwandaise in French 1800 GMT  
10 Sep 91

[Text] Today Dr. Casimir Bizimungu, the head of Rwandan diplomacy, held talks with members of the



diplomatic corps accredited in Kigali and with representatives of international organizations operating in Rwanda, Boniface reports.

[Begin recording] The object of the meeting was to brief them on the decisions of the OAU minisummit which met in Gbadolite, Zaire. Minister Bizimungu recalled the resolutions of the summit, namely on the immediate end to fighting, the restructuring of the military observer group, and the repatriation of Rwandan refugees.

Minister Bizimungu also declared that negotiations between the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front will start on 14 September in Zaire. The *inyenzi-inkotanyi* [rebel-cockroaches] will first have to stop their hostilities and respect the cease-fire.

After meeting with the diplomats, Minister Bizimungu told journalists of Radio Rwanda that the Rwandan delegation will do everything possible so that Rwandan views on the war are honored because even the political parties have already communicated what they think about the war dossier. [end recording]

#### **Rebel Spokesman on Cease-Fire Violation**

AB1109144491 London BBC World Service in English  
1515 GMT 10 Sep 91

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] The latest attempt to end the fighting in Rwanda between government troops and RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] rebels seems to have come to naught. On the very day that a summit of the Rwandan and Zairian presidents called for an immediate cease-fire, Rwandan radio reported an attack by rebel forces in the Mavumba area on the border with Uganda. Barney Phillips contacted RPF spokesman in Brussels, (Patrice Mazimhaka), and asked him first if he acknowledged that there had indeed been fighting since the proposed cease-fire.

[Begin recording] [(Mazimhaka)] There has been a lot of fighting in the northeastern part of the country since then.

[Phillips] Fighting on what scale? Have there been any casualties? Because the Rwandan Government talks about an attack 300 strong; is that true?

[(Mazimhaka)] No, the attacks were not that strong. The Rwandan Government troops were moving into an area which we have been in for quite some time now, and our troops on patrol did intercept them, and they had fighting, and we had two-day skirmishes. Yes there were casualties on the government side, and I am not sure of the exact figures but we did not suffer any casualties on our group.

[Phillips] Mr. (Mazimhaka), whereabouts did the fighting occur?

[(Mazimhaka)] The fighting occurred in the Commune of Muvumba which is northeast of Byumba.

[Phillips] But people will be questioning your commitment or your movement's commitment to peace, Mr. (Mazimhaka), because why did your troops bother to intercept a Rwandan Government patrol only two days after the regional leaders called for a cease-fire? You don't sound like an organization that wants peace at all.

[(Mazimhaka)] Well we do want peace, and I should emphasize that it has been Rwandan Patriotic Front right from the beginning which has been observing cease-fires called by those heads of state. Now what I am telling you now is that this time around we have heard from media outside that a cease-fire was proposed, but then we had not been formally told there is a cease-fire.

[Phillips] But if your troops knew that a cease-fire had at least been proposed, it still sounds as if they behaved in a fairly provocative manner attacking troops so soon after the proposal.

[(Mazimhaka)] But a cease-fire being proposed is not exactly the same thing as a cease-fire has been accepted, and I think I can take you back—and I have said this on the BBC before—we can go back and look that every time that Rwanda accepted a cease-fire proposed by heads of state of the region, they went in and violated it. It happened in October, it happened in November, it happened in December. So this was not different from what they do. It is exactly the same thing they did when we signed a cease-fire agreement in Kinshasa. After signing it, they attacked our positions for the whole month of April. [end recording]

## **Somalia**

### **Ali Mahdi Comments on Fighting in Mogadishu**

*AB1109180591 London BBC World Service in English  
1705 GMT 11 Sep 91*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] In Somalia, it is clear that all is still not well between President Ali Mahdi and his rival, General Mohamed Fara Aidid. Fierce fighting broke out in Mogadishu last week between supporters of the two men, who belong to rival sub-clans of the Hawiye-dominated United Somali Congress, which controls Mogadishu. The fighting, which claimed a large number of lives, led to several UN agencies evacuating their staff. President Ali Mahdi has appealed for an end to the insecurity within 48 hours, while Gen. Aidid has repeated his call for the president to stand down. Peter Biles is in Mogadishu and a short while ago sent this report:

[Begin studio announcer recording] I was driven in an armed convoy to see Mr. Ali Mahdi, who, for security reasons, has moved from his own house to a friend's residence. The interim president admitted that a power struggle was under way, and said that Gen. Aidid's forces wanted to seize power illegally. Mr. Ali Mahdi claimed that Mogadishu was under his control and that sound security would quickly be reestablished.

But while we were talking, there was a fierce exchange of gunfire lasting several minutes, just a short distance away. Mr. Ali Mahdi blamed the incident on criminal elements. Earlier, Gen. Aidid insisted that Mr. Ali Mahdi must resign as interim president, as he had not been elected democratically and had done little to help the country in the eight months since the overthrow of the former president, Siad Barre. Gen. Aidid has called for a cease-fire to avoid further bloodshed. He said he hoped the dispute would be settled peacefully. But he was noncommittal when asked whether fighting would resume if Mr. Ali Mahdi did not agree to step down. A meeting of the Executive Committee of the United Somali Congress is now under way in an effort to resolve the crisis. [end recording]

### **USC Executive Committee Adopts Resolutions**

*EA1209124391 Mogadishu Radio Mogadishu in Somali  
1700 GMT 11 Sep 91*

[Text] The United Somali Congress [USC] Executive Committee has resumed its meeting under the chairmanship of General Mohamed Fara Hassan Aidid, chairman

of the organization. The USC Executive Committee meeting, which was held at the organization's temporary headquarters in Mogadishu, adopted the following resolution: that the members of the USC Executive Committee, people in Benadir Region, elders, and clerics should jointly work to disengage the USC forces pitted against each other so that the Benadir forces can maintain peace in their place.

The USC appeals to the Somali and international relief agencies in Mogadishu to kindly come to the aid of those people affected by the Mogadishu clashes. International organizations and agencies and friendly countries are requested to send in emergency aid consisting of medicine, various medical equipment, tents, doctors, etc., for the wounded and those whose property was destroyed.

The USC Executive Committee appealed to the Somali people to take the wounded to the hospital to receive medical treatment and rehabilitation and also called upon the Ministry of Health to make preparations to participate in the relief operations to help the affected people.

### **Committee of Elders Adopts Resolutions**

*EA1209144591 Mogadishu Radio Mogadishu in Somali  
1815 GMT 11 Sep 91*

[Text] A meeting of a committee of elders for the pacification of the United Somali Congress [USC] communities has issued its first resolutions, according to Mr. Haji Abdullahi Shidow, chairman of the pacification committee for the communities.

Speaking to Jilani Abdulle Jujule, our reporter covering the meeting, Mr. Shidow said that after a short debate the committee issued the following resolutions: —that all involved in the Mogadishu fighting withdraw their units and weapons;

—that the administration of Mogadishu city be maintained by the Somali security forces and other communities' peacekeeping forces;

—that all the abovementioned parties adhere to the calls made by the pacification meeting. A committee comprising wise men, clerics, and fighters was charged with the task of overseeing the implementation of these resolutions.

Mr. Haji Abdullahi Shidow added that the resolutions were the first aimed at maintaining security and [word indistinct] destruction in Mogadishu. The committee will discuss the political causes that led to the fighting in Mogadishu tonight and its findings will be made available to you, God willing, through the media and press.

**Parties, Organizations Not To Sign Peace Accord****Buthelezi Doubtful**

*MB1209154491 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1525 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Text] Johannesburg Sept 12 SAPA—Barely days before the signing of the church and business-brokered national peace accord, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) President Mangosuthu Buthelezi said he doubted it would work.

"I don't see any reason why this accord should work when the accord that we worked out in January with the ANC [African National Congress] did not work," he said in an interview on Wednesday night. He was interviewed by BBC French Service reporter Ms Corinne Moutout in the plush Johannesburg Hotel where the peace convention is due to take place on Saturday.

"I'm not signing because I believe it's going to work out, but if some people want it... As some people clearly are very keen that it should be signed... Then I want to be part of that if it's part of the peace process.

"I don't see why it should work because at the highest level here... I don't think (it will) filter down to a grassroots level, because the way the people are fighting down there in the grassroots that is where the violence is, where they are fighting, where they are killing each other."

The bilateral peace accord between the ANC and IFP was signed in Durban on January 29 to end fighting between members of the two organisations. The day after it was signed IFP members were killed at Umgababa, in Natal, "and from there it just goes on and on", he said.

He accused the ANC of hypocrisy in signing the accord, as the organisation had not responded positively to requests to meet with IFP.

"Which of course I find farcical... on Saturday in this grandeur of the hotel and with all the media there will be the signing of this thing when they are not prepared to talk to us."

He said the ANC had said earlier this year they would meet him after their conference, which was held in Durban in June.

"After the conference I wrote to him (ANC President Nelson Mandela) asking for dates and he never even acknowledged receipt of my letter," charged Mr Buthelezi.

**PAC To Attend Convention; Not To Sign**

*MB1209133091 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1252 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Text] Johannesburg Sept 12 SAPA—The Pan Africanist Congress [PAC] will not sign the draft peace accord at the peace convention in Johannesburg on Saturday, PAC Secretary-General Mr Benny Alexander said on Thursday.

However, the organisation would attend the peace convention as a sign of its rejection of the township violence. PAC President Mr Clarence Makwetu would present the meeting with a written pledge that the organisation would do all it could to end the violence.

Mr Alexander said his organisation had decided not to sign the accord because it:

- gave legitimacy to the SA [South African] Police and SA Defence Force;
- gave legitimacy to the National Party government;
- co-opted the liberation movement into the oppressive system;
- demobilised the oppressed before they had achieved the ballot; and
- suspended the armed struggle against oppression in a back door manner.

Mr Alexander said he did not want to comment on the effectiveness of the draft peace accord. "Some people feel they want to contribute in their own way and we would not want to discourage anyone who wants to make a contribution. We will just put our views alongside the others.

"In spite of our opposition we should not abstain from the conference, we must still make a contribution in our own way."

He said the spirit of the PAC had been appreciated by the conference convenors.

**Azapo Not To Sign Accord**

*MB1309072491 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
2246 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Text] Johannesburg Sept 12 SAPA—The Azanian People's Organisation [Azapo] will not sign the national peace accord on Saturday, but instead may sign its own peace declaration, Information Secretary Mr Strini Moodley told SABC radio news on Thursday. Mr Moodley said Azapo objected to the government's presence at the convention and to the legitimising of the South African Police and Defence Force.

His organisation had not been given sufficient time to consult its constituency on the final draft text of the accord. He added, however, that Azapo was considering signing its own peace declaration, which could be attested by the national peace initiative.

**HNP Not To Sign Accord**

*MB1309062291 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
2217 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Text] Pretoria Sept 12 SAPA—The Herstigte Nasionale Party [Reformed National Party—HNP] on Thursday reaffirmed its decision not to be a party to the draft peace accord to be signed this weekend, charging it is part of a hidden agenda whereby the ANC [African



National Congress)/SACP [South African Communist Party] will be allowed to gain joint authority with the present government.

Commenting on the proposals contained in the draft peace accord, the leader of the HNP, Mr Jaap Marais, said the proposed measures would not stop the violence, but would hamstring police actions against forces causing violence and unrest.

SABC radio news reported Mr Marais alleged the violence was being caused by the African National Congress and the SA [South African] Communist Party in order to make the country ungovernable as a prerequisite to the seizure of power. Therefore, he said, these organisations had to reduce the security forces almost to the status of a peace corps, while at the same time move into a position of joint control over matters of law and order.

Mr Marais said the HNP had no share in the violence. It was the government's responsibility to secure law and order and to deal with those who caused violence in society. If it was unfit to do so, it was unfit to govern.

#### **De Klerk Comments on Steps To Halt Violence**

*MB1209162291 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1616 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Text] Pretoria Sept 12 SAPA—Further steps would be taken, if necessary, to stop the violence sweeping the country, President F.W. de Klerk said on Thursday. Addressing the media at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, he said the government considered the most recent wave of violence, shortly before the signing of the peace accord in Johannesburg, as unacceptable.

Speaking during a courtesy call on him by former Nigerian head of state Gen Olusegun Obasanjo, Mr de Klerk said the government would leave no stone unturned to end the violence. Steps had already been taken to declare as unrest areas certain townships to enable the security forces to take measures against the violence.

Mr de Klerk said he believed the signing of the peace accord on Saturday could make an important contribution to peace if all parties honoured the letter and spirit of the accord.

#### **Further on De Klerk's Comments**

*MB1209190091 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network  
in English 1800 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Text] In Pretoria this evening State President F.W. de Klerk said if necessary the government would have to take further strong steps to curb the violence. Mr. de Klerk was speaking after talks in Pretoria with former Nigerian head of state, General Obasanjo.

[Begin recording] [De Klerk] I want publicly to firstly sympathize with all those—the family of those who lost their lives, with all those who have once again suffered

personal injury, and who have suffered losses. It happened at a stage one week before we have a peace conference for which all of us have worked very hard. It started happening one week before the signature of a very, very important document, which I believe will have a profound effect on the problem of violence. I just came from a meeting where we discussed also the problem of the new violence which has flared up.

The government's approach in this regard is that it is unacceptable, that further strong steps will have to be taken if necessary, and we've done so, we have declared a number of districts as unrest areas and took special powers by doing that, in order to enable the security forces to bring the new spate of violence to an end within a very short period.

Furthermore, we believe that the peace accord, which is to be signed on Saturday, can make an important contribution provided that all the parties who signed will live out the letter and the spirit of that agreement. I want to say in conclusion about the situation of violence that I have no doubt that apart from the peace accord, the real beginning and start of talks and a multiparty conference with regard to the constitutional future is also extremely important.

[Obasanjo] Nobody can convince me that the totality of the leadership of this country cannot bring violence to an end, and I will help in calling on the leadership, whether in government, in political movements, and other organizations, to really join hands and bring violence to an end. And I also want them to realize that as leaders they are going to be held responsible for the blood of those who died while they are exercising leadership and (?trust).

[De Klerk] Unfortunately there are still some political movements which sometimes and quite regularly still make provocative statements which has a tendency to incite people to violence. Therefore, you have my assurance that as we have done in the past, the government will leave no stone unturned to bring the violence to an end. [end recording]

#### **IFP National Chairman on 'Political Violence'**

*MB1209184091 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1806 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Text] Johannesburg Sept 12 SAPA—Violence in South Africa is beyond immediate political control, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) National Chairman Dr Frank Mdlalose said on Thursday night. "We must in all humility say severally and jointly that political violence in South Africa presents vexed problems and stems from circumstances and factors which are beyond immediate political control," said the Inkatha national chairman.

He and African National Congress (ANC) deputy general secretary, Mr Jacob Zuma, addressed the SA [South African] Institute on Race Relations on how the two organisations are dealing with burgeoning violence



which is tearing black communities apart. They made their speeches as the death toll in five days of political warfare in townships around Johannesburg rose to more than 100 with scores injured.

Dr Mdlalose claimed leadership in communities shattered by violence lacked legitimacy and stressed social reconstruction would go far to bring peace to the townships. "In one place, you will have people without leaders and in another place you will have leaders without people.

"The reality is that leadership in a community depends on community institutions and functions for its legitimacy—not just on people and followers," the IFP leader said.

On January 29, the two feuding organisations signed an historic accord, but continuing mayhem has rendered it irrelevant. "The reconstruction of broken communities is in one sense the obvious place to begin...altogether insufficient attention has been paid to the reconstruction of (communities)."

Dr Mdlalose said he and Mr Zuma had been attempting since the January 29 accord to "build on a grassroots reaction to violence which demanded a cessation of hostilities".

"We have been to many areas together, both in townships and in the countryside."

#### Deaths, Injuries Noted Following Reef Violence

MB1209125391 Umtata Capital Radio in English  
1100 GMT 12 Sep 91

[Text] The death toll in the violence that has gripped townships on the Reef since Sunday [8 September] has risen to over 100. Stations and buses have become the major targets for attacks. An attack on a PUTCO [Public Utility Transport Corporation] bus at Vosloorus early this morning has prompted drivers to refuse to travel into the townships. Police liaison officer, Colonel Frans Malherbe, says four people were killed and the same amount were injured in the incident. An eyewitness says a man boarded the bus and when asked for his ticket he pulled out a rifle instead and began shooting.

The witness said at the same time a man jumped out of a white minibus and also started firing. Police say that at least 110 people have been injured in the violence so far.

#### Reef Death Toll Reaches 121

MB1309094291 Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network  
in English 0400 GMT 13 Sep 91

[Excerpt] An ominous calm hangs over the Reef townships this morning after five days of carnage. The death toll now stands at 121. In the latest incident two people were killed when an unidentified black man entered a restaurant in Vosloorus with an AK-47 and opened fire. Sporadic flare-ups have been reported. Police are right

now poised to launch a massive mopping-up operation in Phola Park, Alberton. About 1,500 policemen are standing by.

The latest outbreak of violence spilled over onto buses and trains yesterday and led to a renewed outbreak of the taxi war in the western Cape. Terror reigned in Khayelitsha and continued late into the night as taxi factions torched homes and vehicles and threatened residents. [passage omitted]

#### Involvement in Ciskei Coup Attempt Denied

MB1309090291 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
0505 GMT 13 Sep 91

[Text] East London Sept 12 SAPA—South Africa had no part in an alleged Ciskei coup attempt which has been linked to the deaths of Mr Charles Sebe and Colonel Onward Guzana last year, SA [South Africa] Ambassador to Ciskei Mr Piet Goosen said on Thursday. Mr Goosen was responding to claims made by a witness in the inquest into the deaths of the two rebel Ciskeians.

The witness claimed on Wednesday that President F W de Klerk had known of and supported a plot to overthrow Ciskei's military ruler, Brigadier Oupa Gqozo. At the inquest a diary, presumed to belong to Col Guzana, which had a January 3 entry—"SA Embassy"—was referred to.

Mr Goosen said on Thursday no official of the embassy had had any contact with Col Guzana or Mr Sebe. "With reference to the allegation that South Africa supported a plot to overthrow Brig Gqozo, I wish to state categorically that the South African Government had no part in the alleged coup against the Ciskei government," he said.

#### Agreement To Normalize Trade With CSFR Signed

MB1209184691 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1830 GMT 12 Sep 91

[Text] Pretoria Sept 12 SAPA—An agreement signed in Prague on Thursday provides for the normalisation of trade between South Africa and Czechoslovakia. The agreement provides for the immediate and final abolition by the Czech authorities of trade restrictions against South Africa, the minister of trade and industry, Dr Org Marais, announced on Thursday.

In a statement released in Pretoria, he said "in return, the Government of South Africa will allow all goods of Czechoslovakian origin to be imported into South Africa free of surcharge".

Dr Marais said the agreement he had signed with his Czechoslovakian counterpart was characteristic of the process of normalisation between the two countries, which had gained momentum especially over the past few months. The agreement, furthermore, provided for the strengthening of trade relations.

He pointed out that South Africa and Czechoslovakia had in November 1990 agreed to establish official relations providing for the opening of permanent missions in both countries. The two countries had come a long way since the first contacts between foreign trade officials were made about five years ago.

South Africa had always considered Czechoslovakia as a country with which it would like to develop closer links.

**\* 'Secret' Deals With Sudanese Government**

91P40431Z London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic  
6 Sep 91 p 1

[Text] AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that the mystery man who has played the role of intermediary between the Sudanese Government and the racist government of South Africa in setting up contacts leading to secret deals between the two governments is British businessman Tiny Roland.

Informed sources disclosed to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that Roland met with Lieutenant General Omar Hasan al-Bashir, head of the Sudanese Revolutionary Command Council more than once during the latter's stay last month in London for medical treatment.

These sources added that the British businessman had visited Sudan a number of times and that Sudanese officials have used his private airplane to shuttle between Khartoum and London.

The director of the Foreign Ministry in the Government of South Africa has acknowledged the relations of his government with the Sudanese Government and disclosed that he had twice met with Lt. Gen. al-Bashir, the first time in Khartoum and the second time in London, through an unidentified third party who acted as an intermediary in setting up these contacts.

In an attempt to justify the secret contacts which Roland arranged between Khartoum and Pretoria, some Sudanese officials point out that the British businessman is trying to purchase the factories owned by Sudanese businessman Dr. Khalil 'Uthman, over which the Sudanese Government recently took control.

**\* SADF Maintains Border Post Security**

91AF1324A Pretoria PARATUS in Afrikaans  
Jun 91 pp 36-37

[Article by Lt. George Thiar: "South African Defense Force [SADF] Also Keeps Border Posts Safe"]

[Text] The 111th Battalion is situated in the small, picturesque village of Amsterdam in Southeastern Transvaal. The battalion is located within the Group 12 area, with headquarters in Ermelo. This is a hilly region with clean fresh air and thickly planted trees which give color to the landscape. During the rainy season, the earth roads are virtually impassable.

"The unit's task is to provide security for the eastern border of Group 12 (a strip of about 295 kilometers along the border with Swaziland). This is done by carrying out effective border protection and implementing border control operations in the assigned area," said Major Louwtjie de Beer, SO2 Operations connected to the 111th Battalion.

The unit is divided into five companies, each of which is individually responsible for the area assigned to it. Thus Alpha Company serves the Mahamba, Hondkop and Bothashoop border posts.

The men are responsible, among other things, for border protection operations, patrols, and vehicle check points. In addition, they also serve the Oshoek, Macadamia, and Nerston border posts.

Traditionally, these border control posts are manned by members of the South African police force. Last year, however, a request was made to the SADF to take over these responsibilities. The SADF officially took over this task on 7 December 1990.

A problem originally experienced with this takeover was that members of the SADF did not have as much experience as their colleagues in the South African police force who had been involved for years in this kind of work. This problem was bridged in time with thorough practical training.

**Purpose**

The purpose of these border control posts is to make sure that no illegal weapons, vehicles, persons, or narcotics enter the RSA [Republic of South Africa]. In this context, the Mobile Explosives Detection System (MSOS) is used very successfully.

Air is sucked out of a vehicle and into a pipe. The pipe is then placed among three other pipes. A search dog then checks the four pipes and indicates whether the vehicle may possibly be carrying explosives, weapons, or hashish. Explosives-sniffing dogs and hashish-sniffing dogs are used with great success.

Weapons and hashish are brought in mostly because of their financial value. Illegal border crossers are usually looking for work in the RSA.

Large vehicles transporting wood, for example, are a problem given that the entire contents must be physically unloaded in order to ensure a successful search. The same is true for large container vehicles.

**Cooperation**

Official contact between the SADF and representatives from Swaziland takes place regularly. There is good cooperation between the two neighboring countries. Both recognize the value of an effective border control system.

The Oshoek border post (on the Swaziland border) boasts that, aside from Jan Smuts airport, it is the largest entryway into the RSA. During the past Easter weekend, this post handled 36,450 individuals and roughly 4,591 cars over the four day period. This border post is used primarily because of its favorable infrastructure.

If traffic becomes too heavy at Oshoek, they use the Nerston border post located approximately 17 kilometers from Amsterdam along the border with Swaziland.

The Mahamba border post, about 30 kilometers from Piet Relief, is a well equipped camp. A swimming pool was built for the troops, the so-called "Mahamba Sun" can be used for barbecues, and there are also video facilities for relaxation.

"The members of the SADF who man this post regularly receive positive feedback from the public. They are complimented on the positive manner in which they perform their tasks," said Major De Beer.

#### \* SADF Inspector General Describes Role

91AF1324B Pretoria PARATUS in Afrikaans  
Jun 91 pp 12-13

[Article by Lt. George Thiar: "Not Merely a Watchdog"]

[Text] Generally speaking, there is a sense of uncertainty among the members of the SADF [South African Defense Force] concerning the function of the Inspector General of the Defense Force (IG SADF). Questions regularly come up, such as: What is the purpose of the Inspectorate and how does this body operate?

The IG SADF is directly responsible to the head of the SADF and has direct access to the respective heads of the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Medical Service. The image being portrayed that the IG is merely a "watchdog" is far removed from the truth; rather, he acts as representative of the SADF. The IG is responsible for making sure that the system runs smoothly and effectively.

The Inspectorate consists of two independent Directorates, specifically the Directorate for Internal Audit and the Directorate for Inspections. Generally speaking, these two directorates strive to create a healthy work atmosphere in the SADF and they implement a system of effective management and productivity.

The personnel of these two directorates is small in numbers. The Directorate for Inspections usually has six full-time members, while the personnel figure for the Directorate for Internal Audit is approximately 50. They are supported by graduated NDP's [expansion not given] and members of the Militia who attend service (camps) at regular intervals throughout the year.

#### Dynamic

The Directorate for Inspections is a dynamic organization where no definitive guidelines are set down according to which inspections must be carried out. The inspector's experience, power of discernment, and personality contribute greatly to the professional implementation of his tasks. The inspections are divided into two closely related categories, specifically General and Specific Inspections. The general inspections cover the overall functioning and activities of a unit, while specific inspections concentrate on a particular aspect or problem.

The main functions of the Directorate in question include:

(a) Monitoring of the following SADF activities at the H SADF level:

1. General administration
2. Manpower use and handling
3. Logistic (technical) effectiveness
4. Financial management/management measures
5. Planning and general administrative processes and systems

(b) The handling of proposals, criticism and complaints from internal and external sources concerning improvements and/or faults in the SADF.

(c) Acting as observer: attending several meetings and making contributions when necessary.

The Directorate supports units in the exercise of their tasks and improves the existing systems. They do not act as policemen, but rather make use of their knowledge and experience to eliminate mistakes and corrupt practices which may appear in the system.

#### Complaints Office

The Complaints Office, which is under the control of this Directorate, was brought to life a couple of years ago. It serves as a central office where parents and family members of NDP's [expansion not given] can vent their grievances and complaints.

Inspections show evidence of flexibility and are constructive in nature. The inspection standards are high, but always realistic and reasonable. The interests of the SADF are kept at heart at all times and unit personnel are motivated to perform even better.

Hence, the Directorate for Internal Audit (DIO) also occupies its rightful position within the SADF. The DIO serves as administrative aid at all levels and has been in existence for the last 70 years.

The word audit is derived from the Latin word "audire," which means "someone who listens." Consequently, an auditor is someone who investigates the correctness and reliability of someone else's mathematical records and submits a report on his findings.



The extent of the Internal Audit within the SADF includes the following functions:

- a. A review of the reliability and integrity of the personnel, logistic, and financial information.
- b. A review of the system which is to ensure that certain policies, plans, procedures, laws, and provisions are implemented.
- c. A review of the effectiveness with which SADF resources are put to use.
- d. A review of the methods by which assets are protected; and
- e. A review to determine whether activities and programs are implemented according to their respective planning.

#### Individuals With Degrees

Considered in lay terminology, this means that the DIO assists the SADF in achieving goals in a cost effective manner.

The Directorate is in the fortunate position of being able to accommodate individuals with accountant's degrees, who serve as NDP's. These NDP's are used successfully and for them it is a unique experience to work for a body which oversees more than 6,000 accounts nationwide.

The Directorate also relies on input from outside the SADF, provided by private firms and organizations. There is close contact with the Council of Chartered Accountants, as well as Infoplan and university training bodies.

The Directorate is currently in the process of developing two very important auditing programs, specifically AUDOPLAN and NOVUS. The NOVUS program is an audit which will start with an approved budget and continue through the final spending and appropriation of those funds.

The Directorate yearly holds a week long seminar where the management of the DIO comes together and discusses audit practices and new techniques.

The seminar serves as a think tank to make the Directorate for Internal Audit strong within the SADF.

#### \* Commander Describes Bloemhof Command

91AF1324C Pretoria PARATUS in Afrikaans  
Jun 91 pp 18-19

[Article by Lt. George Thiar: "The Connecting Factor"]

[Text] "Our Command testifies to a rich and proud history," said Major J.D. van Zyl, commander of the Bloemhof Command.

The Bloemhof Command developed together with the West Transvaal village by the same name, which was

established in 1866. The village was given its name by Mr. James Barkley, its first shopkeeper. The first two white inhabitants of the region, which would later become the Bloemhof District, were two missionaries, Smit and Kraus. The mission station was located near the current Britten. The village is located on the Klipfontein place, which originally belonged to Mr. Pieter van Niekerk.

The first available information on the command dates from the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. During the war, the Bloemhof Command served as a unit in the field and fought under the leadership of Commander Tollie de Beer.

As a fighting unit, together with the Lichtenburg Command and the Wolmaransstad Command, the unit participated in several campaigns under the leadership of the legendary General Koos de la Rey.

#### Drowned

Following the establishment of the Union in 1910, another command was set up in Bloemhof under the leadership of Commander Piet de la Rey Swart. This command served as a unit on the side of the government during the Rebellion. During the Rebellion, Commander Swart and Captain Frikkie Clase assisted in the identification of the body of General Byers who drowned in the Vaal River.

Afterwards, this unit was not mobilized again. During the year 1979 the then commander, Commander Van Rensburg, together with members of the command served in a Group 21 company doing border duty in Owamboland.

In 1989 the first black platoon was trained in the command. They are used to stabilize black residential areas and often man road blockades.

"The command binds us together as a community," said Maj. van Zyl. "In the new South Africa the command will play an even greater role, including in the economic area. In cooperation with other institutions, the command will have to help people who have lost their jobs become independent again. The members of the command demonstrate a positive disposition."

#### Collection

"Our command boasts a large collection of numerous articles dating from the First and Second World Wars. This collection was made possible by the hard work of Sergeant Boet Percival, a clerk in the command," said Maj. van Zyl.

Sgt. Percival also established the Command Headquarters building. "I started building this collection up for the command over the last three years. Most of the articles were given to me graciously by people in the area. My father always threw these things out and today they are very valuable," laughed Sgt. Percival.



This collection includes an old field telephone used during the Second World War, a small tin filled with sweets which had been sent to the men at the front for "Christmas 1943" by General Smuts, and numerous other items.

Sgt. Percival wants to retire by the end of the year and then spend full time collecting. He thanks the people for their donations and would like to encourage others to make further contributions.

#### \* Various Parties Comment on Defense Issues

91AF1324D Pretoria PARATUS in Afrikaans  
Jun 91 pp 26-27

[Unattributed Article: "SADF Will Always Be Formidable"]

[Text] In the May 1991 edition of PARATUS, extracts from speeches by the minister of defense, General Magnus Malan, and his deputy minister, Mr. Wynand Breytenbach, were published. Divergent views on defense matters were also voiced by members of Parliament during the Defense Vote Debate on 25-26 April. A summary of some of the opinions and comments expressed, is given below.

Mr. J.H. (Koos) van der Merwe (KP [Conservative Party], Overvaal) stated as introduction that the Conservative Party would like to concentrate on a central theme, specifically: Quo Vadis, South African Defense Force, whereto? He then congratulated all soldiers who have served their fatherland—from the lowest conscript to the head of the Defense Force.

Referring to the above mentioned theme, he stated: "The real strength of the SADF lies in the commands and the militia, because they make up 90 percent of the SADF. As to the pressing question of what is going to happen to the SADF, we want to say to the members of the militia and the commando that the SADF will always be relevant. It will always be formidable. It will always be there to protect our women and our children, as long as they—the members of the militia and the commands—are there to serve the SADF with goodwill and complete loyalty."

He further stated that the people trust the members of the militia and of the commands and that they will need them now more than ever before. Mr. Van der Merwe called on the members of the militia and of the command forces not to resign from the SADF under any circumstances.

During his speech, Mr. Van der Merwe also said that the government should not be in too great a hurry to eliminate the powers of the SADF. "A sensible and wise government will first wait and make dead certain that there really is no threat before it becomes quite at ease," he added.

#### Difference

According to Lieutenant General Bob Rogers (Democratic Party, Walmer) the composition and character of the "new defense force" of the future will differ considerably from what it is today. "The future defense force will then not only represent, but will also have to accept recruits from across the political spectrum. This will include members from Umkhonto we Sizwe [MK—Spear of the Nation], PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], Inkatha, and members of the armies of the independent homelands and members of the present tricameral political parties," he said.

He went on to say that all these elements of the SADF would have to swear allegiance to the SADF and to South Africa. Lt. Gen. Rogers stressed, however, that there will be no room for divided loyalties to political or ideological parties outside the Defense Force.

Lt. Gen. Rogers averred that the SADF could be used as an instrument to help the building of a new South Africa and provisions should be made for it to carry out nonmilitary tasks in peacetime, such as air/sea rescue missions and engineering tasks in outlying areas.

#### Challenges

Dr. B.L. (Boy) Geldenhuys (National Party [NP], Brentwood), the NP's main spokesperson on defense, said that one of the challenges facing the SADF is to remain effective in spite of necessary cuts in the defense budget and personnel reductions. "The SADF passed this test with flying colors. This speaks volumes for the management powers of the SADF, and for this, both the chief of the Defense Force and his top management deserve praise," said Dr. Geldenhuys.

He did warn, however, that there should not be any continuous cuts in the defense budget to the extent that ultimately the SADF loses its effectiveness. "A well-trained, professional, and well-armed conventional defense force, supported by an effective arms industry, remains a prerequisite for a secure future, without which no country with any self-respect can get along. It may well be, please note, it may well be that any further budget cuts may place South Africa in a risky situation," he added.

He stated that the task of the Defense Force lies in defending all people of South Africa, and added that the self-defense units of the ANC [African National Congress] and Umkhonto we Sizwe, the victory commands of the AWB [Afrikaner Resistance Movement], the Conservative Party (KP)'s people's army, and the Transvaal Agricultural Union's so-called defense force have no role to play. According to Mr. Geldenhuys, the existence of such "quasi-military institutions" is a recipe for civil war and chaos.

### Violence

Referring to the high level of violence in South Africa, Mr. Douglas Josephs (Labor Party [AP], Riversdal) argued that now the ANC is on the receiving end and complains about it. "Now they demand heads.... They accuse the South African police. They accuse the SADF.... They are in the process of reaping the fruits of their proclamation of liberation politics and civil disobedience," he added.

In this context, he stated that the Defense Force is serving with distinction in the middle of this volatile situation. "They do not complain and they carry out their task in an extremely professional manner. They serve our country and all its people with dedication.... The security forces, the Defense Force, and the police are not responsible for the violence.... It is a privilege for us to be associated with the Defense Force."

### Invincible

Mr. Patrick McKenzie (Labor Party, Bonteheuwel) argued that Mr. Chris Hani, Zulu leader of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) should not refer to that organization as a "people's army." The SADF is the real "people's army" because it is composed of all the peoples of South Africa. "We see the Defense Force as our own. It is invincible. It is the 'people's army'." Mr. Chris Hani knew from the very beginning that Umkhonto we Sizwe did not have a chance against the SADF, according to Mr. McKenzie.

### ARMSCOR

Mr. Kasaval Chetty (Chatsworth Central Solidarity) congratulated the Defense Force and ARMSCOR [Armaments Corporation of South Africa] for the excellent service they render to South Africa. "Let us not be lulled into a false sense of security by elements wishing to discredit our defense force. Much has been said in an effort to make the SADF suspect. At the same time the people who make these unfounded allegations strive to increase their own power base through violence and intimidation. The SADF, however, has remained steadfast and is a mainstay for stability and order," he said. Pointing out that the Defense Force is a defense force "for all the people of South Africa," he said that it cannot be allowed to become a political instrument.

Referring to the speculation about a merger between the SADF and Umkhonto we Sizwe, Mr. Chetty said there can be no possibility of this happening. "The SADF consists of highly trained officers and men, while Umkhonto we Sizwe is a guerilla army, not a regular army, in the words of its own chief of staff." He continued: "It is therefore clear that a highly professional force like the SADF cannot be expected to merge with a nonprofessional force trained solely for insurgency. The basis of all this is the professionalism of the South African soldier."

Mr. Cecil Herandien (Democratic Reform Party, Macassar) expressed his thanks to everyone in uniform and

added that it is necessary for the Defense Force to remain strong. In this respect he noted that members of all population groups have had a share in the victory of the South African forces along the Angolan border, and further stated that the South African Cape Corps (SAKK) fills its place in the SADF with pride.

### \* Future of State, Union Relations Analyzed

91AF1331C Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS  
in English Aug 91 pp 31-37

[Article by Devan Pillay and Eddie Webster, professor of Sociology at Wits University: "Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions], the Party and the Future State"; first paragraph is WORK IN PROGRESS introduction]

[Text] Through an examination of the recent history of the union movement, the authors look at scenarios of future relations between a democratic state and the trade union movement, and argue that the South African labour movement is well-poised to avoid the mistakes of post-colonial Africa.

What will the relationship be between a future democratic state and the trade union movement? What lessons can the trade union movement learn from post-colonial Africa?

Fundamental differences exist in the perceptions of the trade union role, differences that have divided the movement since unions first emerged in nineteenth century Europe. The division lies between those who see significant potential in trade union activity, and those who argue that such activity does not in itself facilitate (indeed some hold that it may even inhibit) the transformation of capitalist society.

Hyman refers to the former as the optimistic tradition and the latter as the pessimistic tradition—foremost of which is the Leninist tradition which counterposes the leading role of the communist party to the inevitable 'economism' of trade unions (Hyman).

These differences have consequences for the choices trade unions make in the face of the unfolding struggle for democracy in South Africa. They affect the class content of any national liberation struggle, and will ultimately influence the character of a democratic South Africa.

### The Evolution of Political Unionism

An alliance between the trade union movement and the national liberation movement emerged in South Africa in 1955, when the South African Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu) was formed.

Sactu's alliance with the ANC [African National Congress] and the Congress movement redefined its trade union role along the lines of 'political unionism'. Faced by a weak power base in the factories, a hostile state and

intransigent employers, Sactu chose to engage politically with nationalism as a means of transforming its small factory base.

The 1950s experiment in political unionism hardly had time to consolidate before it was pre-empted by the state repression of the early and mid-1960s. South Africa was to experience a decade of 'industrial peace' (and economic growth). During the 1970s a new wave of shop-floor based unions began to emerge in the wake of the 1973 strikes. These emerging unions chose to concentrate on building democratic shopfloor structures, based on worker control, accountability and the mandating of worker representatives, as a basis for developing working class leadership in the factories.

These challenges, as well as the student uprisings that began in 1976, were to culminate in the recognition of black unions for the first time in South African labour history.<sup>(1)</sup>

#### Different Traditions

A new system of rule began to emerge in the workplace, laying the basis for a system of industrial citizenship. This was to give workers a new self-confidence. It created, for the first time in Africa, a shopfloor tradition amongst the unions affiliated to the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu), as well as the Cape Town-based Food and Canning Workers Union (FCWU) and the General Workers Union (GWU).

The FCWU and GWU initially combined this emphasis on shopfloor activity with a commitment to seeking alliances with the broader community. Through this united action, these unions were for a short period (1979-81) drawn closer to the emerging community organisations, and the new general unions. The most notable 'community union' was the South African Allied Workers Union (Saawu) which, following in the tradition of Sactu, stressed the need to link struggles in the workplace with township struggles. They argued that it was 'economism' and 'workerism' for unions to restrict activities to factory struggle.

This 'national democratic' or 'Congress' (ANC-oriented) tradition involved a view that South Africa could not be understood in simple class terms. Social reality was based on a 'colonialism of a special type' (CST), necessitating 'national-democratic' rather than 'class' struggle as the appropriate strategic response.<sup>(2)</sup> This meant a multi-class alliance under the leadership of the ANC, drawing on all sectors of the oppressed masses and sympathetic whites, and aiming to establish a 'national democracy'.

A third political tradition, black consciousness (BC), spawned its own union, the Black and Allied Workers Union (Bawu) during the 1970s. BC emphasised 'black leadership' of the trade unions and opposed 'non-racialism' in favour of a policy of 'anti-racism'. In practice this has meant opposition to white intellectual leadership in the trade union movement.

The Council of Unions of South Africa (Cusa), which was formed out of those unions which refused to form part of Fosatu in 1979, was mildly BC. Although part of the four-year unity talks aimed at forming one trade union centre, Cusa withdrew in 1985, and did not form part of Cosatu. Instead, it joined with the strongly BC Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (Azactu) in 1986 to form the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu).

#### Strategic Compromise

The rapid mobilisation by 'community unions' in the early 1980's, the emergence of community organisations overtly associated with the national democratic tradition, and the growing interest in political involvement amongst rank-and-file leadership, forced Fosatu to respond to criticism that it was isolating itself from wider political struggle (see Lambert & Webster).

Fosatu officially began to take up non-factory issues, for example opposition by the Kattlehong shopsteward local to the destruction of shacks on the East Rand, and the rejection of the tricameral parliamentary elections. However, the turning point came when Fosatu entered into joint action with student and civic organisations in the historic 1984 November Transvaal stayaway. This was made possible both by the overlapping membership of these organisations and pressure from union members demanding action in the face of rising rents, transport costs, Bantu Education and the repressive local government system.

The formation of Cosatu in December 1985 brought together unions from all three political traditions described above: the well-organised unions drawn from the 'shop-floor' tradition; the general unions drawn from the 'national democratic' tradition; and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), having recently broken from the BC tradition.

Cosatu now faced the difficult task of blending these diverse political traditions into a working class political project. This challenge was captured by the NUM's Cyril Ramaphosa (now ANC general secretary), in his opening speech to the inaugural congress of the federation. Cosatu, he said, would take an active role in national politics in alliance with other progressive organisations, but such an alliance would be on terms favourable to the working class.

Tactical, strategic and theoretical differences began to narrow in the first half of 1987, as Cosatu wove together what Jon Lewis has called 'a strategic compromise' (Lewis).

One example of this was the political resolution adopted by the National Union of Metalworkers (Numsa), at its May 1987 foundation conference. Rather than challenge symbols of the national democratic tradition, Numsa endorsed the Freedom Charter as a 'good foundation stone on which to start building our working class



programme', thus attempting to imprint on the Freedom Charter the strategy of the shopfloor tradition.

In adopting the Freedom Charter, Cosatu also noted that it saw the struggle against national oppression and economic exploitation as 'complementary to each other and part of an uninterrupted struggle for total liberation'. There is, in this argument, no conflict between the struggles for national liberation and socialism (Fine & Webster).

#### **Current Balance of Forces**

The democratic trade union movement, almost six years after the launch of Cosatu, is still divided.

Cosatu itself has grown in strength, and now has over 1.2 million paid-up members. It is recognised by both the state and employers as the major trade union force, and has won a range of battles on the shopfloor, from union recognition and massive wage increases to maternity benefits and national bargaining. The three traditions which merged into Cosatu have by-and-large gelled into a transformed 'national-democratic' or Congress formation. 1990 saw Cosatu replacing Sactu in the revolutionary alliance with the ANC and the SACP [South African Communist Party].

However, although 1989 saw greater cooperation between Cosatu and Nactu, through the Workers Summit and the joint stayaway against amendments to the Labour Relations Act (LRA), the prospects of Nactu merging with Cosatu remain relatively remote.

Indeed, since its 1988 Congress, the much smaller Nactu has been in some disarray. In contrast to Cosatu's developing internal unity, Nactu has experienced an increasingly fierce internal struggle between its black consciousness (Azapo) supporters and its Africanist (PAC) supporters. The latter has since 1988 succeeded in taking control of the federation (see Pillay, 1990c).

Finally, there still exists a large number of small unaffiliated unions, e.g., the Cape Health Workers Union, which has established a strong base in the Western Cape. Outside the democratic camp, a range of unaffiliated unions recently formed the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of SA [Republic of South Africa] (Fitusa) in opposition to Cosatu and Nactu.

#### **The Cosatu-ANC-SACP Alliance**

Cosatu worked closely with the ANC-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF) since its formation. When that organisation was restricted in 1988, Cosatu, as a major part of the loose replacement, the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), often found itself taking the lead in political campaigns.

The alliance has taken on a distinct character since the unbanning of the ANC and SACP (which has occurred within the context of an unfolding climate of negotiations between the ANC and the apartheid regime). To what extent has Cosatu compromised its independence

by entering into such an alliance, and to what extent has Cosatu played a determining role in the alliance? The answers to these questions have direct implications for the future relationship between Cosatu and an ANC/SACP-led government.

At one level, Cosatu has exercised a great deal of influence on the alliance, and is well-poised to play an even greater role in shaping the character of that alliance. Apart from MDM-related political activities, Cosatu's collective bargaining muscle and expertise has placed it at the centre of a wide variety of issues concerning a future democratic South Africa. The federation has played a prominent role in formulating policy on, for example future economic options, housing, education, health, training and social benefits.

A future democratic government will be unable to ignore the organised might of Cosatu as it tries to transform society, no matter what the exact nature of union/government relationship is. A degree of partnership will be inevitable at the socio-economic level.

However, at the strictly state-political level, the debate about the role of trade unions, and its relationship with political parties, becomes crucial. It has direct implications for the possibilities of constructing a democratic society such that working class issues and concerns are paramount.

#### **Cosatu Is Not Homogeneous**

While Cosatu has moved well beyond the 'strategic compromise' of 1987-88, and strengthened its internal unity, it is by no means a politically homogeneous federation. On the one hand, the dominant Congress orientation of Cosatu is itself composed of various emphases, some of which stand in direct contrast to one another. On the other hand, some officials and shopstewards belong to other liberation organisations, including the Workers Organisation for Socialist Action (Wosa), the Marxist Workers Tendency (MWT), the New Unity Movement, Azapo and the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress].

Differences within Congress range from the position that Cosatu should simply follow the lead of the ANC and SACP at the political level, to the position that Cosatu should be a more independent and critical partner in the alliance. Thus, in the first position, Cosatu does not need to be independently represented in negotiations with the regime, as the ANC and SACP can adequately represent labour (see Pillay, 1990a).

At the other end of the spectrum is the position that Cosatu must be independently represented in all negotiations leading to a constituent assembly. Cosatu representatives should be directly accountable to Cosatu, and subject to recall if necessary. In addition, Cosatu should first formulate its own position at every stage of negotiations, and then meet with the ANC and SACP to



formulate an alliance position, which is then taken to the negotiation table (see SA LABOUR BULLETIN Volume 15, No 3).

This perspective has been strengthened by the way the alliance has been operating since the unbannings. Cosatu, as well as the SACP, have often complained about not being properly consulted by the ANC, particularly when the ANC has made fundamental tactical shifts. Many unionists now make a distinction between Cosatu's alliance with the ANC, and its alliance with the SACP, where it is felt that the unions' independence and integrity is respected more (see Daniels, 1991).

Significantly, out of the four unionists who publicly emerged as SACP leaders in July 1990, two are senior Numsa leaders. Moses Mayekiso, Numsa general-secretary and president of the recently-formed Civic Association for the Southern Transvaal (Cast), and John Gomomo, full-time Numsa shopsteward and Cosatu second vice-president, both come from the 'shopfloor' Fosatu tradition. According to Gomomo, the unions have been playing a central role in determining how the SACP structures its legal presence (Pillay, 1990b).

#### The Cosatu-SACP Alliance

The SACP's draft workers charter, which was circulated in 1989, gives a clear indication of current thinking within the party about trade union independence. In contrast to the traditional 'transmission belt' conception of trade unionism of the past, the party now states that there shall be 'no restrictions' on the rights of workers to belong to political parties or trade unions. Unions should be 'completely independent' and answerable only to the democratic decisions of their members.

It states clearly: 'No political party, state organ or enterprise ... shall ... interfere with such independence'. All workers shall have the right to strike, and all collective bargaining legislation shall 'require the consent of the majority in the trade union movement'. Thus the party sees the unions playing a vibrant and determining role in shaping a future South Africa (see WIP 62/63).

In March 1990 the party and Cosatu, after meeting together in Harare, restated the necessity of Cosatu remaining independent 'as a matter of principle and practice' (see Pillay, 1990a). These sentiments have been repeated by top party officials like Joe Slovo (WIP 64), Mac Maharaj (SASPU FOCUS Vol 1, No 3) and Jeremy Cronin (SA LABOUR BULLETIN Vol 15, No 3). They came as a relief to many unionists in Cosatu, who over the years have witnessed dogmatic and sectarian practices of many party activists, within the unions and outside.

But for many unionists the question is: to what extent is the new party outlook and commitment to democratic principles and practices deeply entrenched in the party? This has direct implications for the extent to which Cosatu, as an alliance partner, is compelled by objective

circumstances to compromise its independence in the interests of maintaining a united front against the apartheid regime.

#### Cause for Optimism?

Although Fawu [Food and Allied Workers Union], of which Chris Dlamini is president, has been accused of adopting 'Stalinist' practices (see Theron, 1990), the four unionists (Dlamini, Mufamadi, Gomomo and Mayekiso) who are part of the SACP's ILG [Interim Leadership Group], all express views which reflect the party's new outlook, in particular a sensitivity towards the need to maintain trade union independence (see Pillay, 1990b).

Gomomo reveals the extent of the unionists' influence by pointing out that, in May 1990, the party asked the unions to guide it in establishing itself as a legal, democratic organisation with proper structures of accountability. Gomomo feels certain that any remaining traces of 'Stalinism' in the party will be swept away by the thousands of union members who will be joining the party.

[Less optimistic unionists feel that the unions will be the ones to change, as the 'inherent' dogmatism and sectarianism of the party (see box on page 34) takes root, as evidenced in the recent history of Fawu (for example see Theron, 1990)].

As argued elsewhere (see Pillay, 1990b) these four unionists, and the Numsa unionists in particular, are unlikely to have been 'co-opted' by a form of 'Stalinism'. Instead, their appointments as SACP leaders point to a movement on both sides: the 'shopfloor' unionists having confidence in the party and appreciating the need to engage more assertively within the arena of state-power politics, and the party recognising that the organisational strength of Cosatu is largely due to the emphasis the old Fosatu placed on building an independent democratic organisation primarily around workplace issues.

Only time will tell whether these unionists' confidence is justified. Nevertheless, this convergence does suggest the real possibility of an extension and deepening of the 'leadership of the working class' in the struggle against apartheid, and the 'uninterrupted' transition to socialism.

#### Building 'Working Class Politics'

'Working class politics' means different things to different political projects. For 'Trotskyists' in Wosa and the MWT, it means narrowing the base of the national liberation struggle to include only the 'working class' (rural and urban workers, the unemployed, housewives, school pupils), what is left of the peasantry and, at a distance, sections of the black 'petty bourgeoisie'. It means campaigning around workplace issues, living conditions, transport issues, etc., within the framework of a 'direct' struggle for socialism.

In practice this means avoiding broad alliances with all sections of the community, including the religious communities, certain Bantustan leaders, sections of capital, etc. Either the ANC has to be transformed into a working class party with a socialist programme, or an independent working class party (which may form a tenuous alliance with the ANC) must be at the head of 'working class politics'.

Cosatu and the SACP, however, have brought to the fore a different kind of 'working class politics'—one which can flow comfortably with the broad current of 'national-democratic' politics, giving it a distinct democratic working class imprint. This is to ensure that national liberation proceeds to a democratic socialism, and is not diverted to one or other form of exploitative authoritarianism.

In contrast to the neo-'Stalinist' perspective mentioned earlier, and the 'Trotskyist' perspective outlined above, the evolving relationship between the SACP and Cosatu point to a critical partnership path for Cosatu in its relations with the party and/or the ANC (depending on whether the ANC-SACP alliance continues as it is, whether the party and the ANC merge, or whether the party itself becomes a critical partner in a looser alliance).

In this sense 'working class politics' means building a strong working class movement (including the trade unions, the party and mass organisations within working class communities) that will bring working class issues and concerns to the forefront of national liberation politics. The campaign for a Workers' Charter, and the possibilities that it brings of forging a united workers' movement, is an essential part of this process (see Pillay, 1991a).

#### Future Scenarios

Does the existence of a relatively strong labour movement open up the possibility of extending democratic working class hegemony in a future South Africa? In an interview with WIP (No 69), the noted radical sociologist Michael Burawoy has suggested that South Africa is unique 'in that its relatively advanced economic base has engendered powerful working class struggles before democratisation. In this context democratisation can further escalate demands which capitalism patently cannot meet'.

What are the politics of the labour movement likely to be in a democratic South Africa? It has been pointed out that, at one level, the objective situation will impose a high degree of cooperation between the labour movement and a future democratic government. As the current government is rapidly realising, the strength and expertise of the labour movement cannot be ignored at the socio-economic level. This is particularly so in terms of drafting labour legislation, developing the collective bargaining system, and formulating economic and social

policies. However, while there may be union-state cooperation in certain areas, there may be conflict in other areas.

At the state-political level, the labour movement under a future democratic government will be faced with a number of options. As has been the case in post-colonial Africa, the path the unions will follow at this level will be largely determined by the struggles that are fought along the road to liberation (this will have a direct bearing on the relationship between the unions and the leading forces of liberation, the ANC and SACP). During the current conjuncture, the crucial issue is the manner in which a political settlement is reached.

If the current negotiations process does not involve the mass membership of the ANC, and the independent participation of Cosatu, and results in a behind-the-scenes settlement which falls far short of a constituent assembly (and therefore a highly compromised ANC government) then it is very likely that mass dissatisfaction with the process will rise amongst organised workers.

If, on the other hand, the negotiations process takes on a more bottom-up character, and results in a non-racial, democratic constituent assembly where the people, and in particular organised workers, play a determining role in drawing up a new constitution, then the tripartite alliance is likely to be strengthened.

#### Class Contradictions

In a post-apartheid society, however, class contradictions are likely to come sharply to the fore as the new state embarks upon the task of national development (no matter how democratic this state is). Trade unions which emphasise their representative role by struggling to defend and improve members' working and living conditions, could easily be seen as opponents of the new state's attempts at national development. A new government is likely to argue that the urban organised working class is not the most dispossessed.

But attempts to forge national unity, to prevent the flight of capital and scarce skills, and to encourage foreign investment, will put pressure on a new government to limit its redistributive efforts (especially to the unorganised rural population, and the unemployed). The government is therefore likely to be strong on promises, but unable to meet all its commitments in the short-term. This could push the unions to continue to find common cause with other dispossessed strata—particularly if its alliance with a democratic party of the whole working class (which the SACP may become) strengthens.

These pressures will place the new state in a dilemma: will it try to accommodate these working class pressures and become a state in which working class concerns as a whole predominate? Or will it allow the interests of capital to dominate, accepting the inevitability of a labour-dominated socialist opposition. A third possibility is that a socialist opposition could be the result of

a creative tactical move by the triple alliance. The latter scenario has been identified by Burawoy (see WIP 69, p 36):

'An ANC government could deliberately institutionalise a socialist opposition to itself in the form of the Communist Party and Cosatu. In this view the Communist Party would be more effective out of power. In alliance with Cosatu, it would propel a government towards re-distributive socialism by mobilising pressure from civil society, from the community and workplace. Moreover, with socialism in opposition, destabilisation by international capitalism or a coup from the right would be less likely'.

A fourth option for the union movement is to become completely independent of political parties, in the interests of forging a united trade union movement. In terms of this scenario, Cosatu, Nactu and the unaffiliated unions could come under one umbrella, and the unions could decide to concentrate on collective bargaining.

The problem raised by collective bargaining unionism is that its exclusive focus on workplace issues may lead to an acceleration of the divisions between unionised and non-unionised workers mentioned earlier. Recent research on the labour market points to a growing stratification of the black labour force, in particular the emergence of a skilled stratum of African workers (Hindson and Crankshaw).

This creates the possibility of an increasingly divided African workforce in the 1990s, in which an 'economistic' trade union movement facilitates the divide between the well-paid unionised workforce and a growing stratum of rural and urban poor.

Given these structural trends unions face a choice: should they prioritise the narrow interests of their members, or do they continue with their central aim of building a social movement of working people as a whole?

#### Political Unionism

The latter outcome could be facilitated by the existence of a party of the whole working class, which consciously forged unity between organised and unorganised workers, and the unemployed. If the SACP is to succeed in this role, it would have to rid itself of all 'Stalinist' tendencies (see box), and become a party that is both internally democratic and a 'watchdog' for democracy everywhere.

By combining links at grassroots level with the development of public policy, Cosatu has developed a form of political unionism which challenges the traditional division of labour between unions and parties, whereby parties formulate policies and programmes while unions confine themselves to action over wages and working conditions. The implications of this form of unionism, is that the union movement is well-placed to formulate

policies that synthesise a class interest, and that in this respect the electoral party cannot act as its surrogate (Higgins).

In some instances of developed political unionism, such as Sweden and the CGIL [Italian General Labor Conference] in Italy, the union movement has elaborated a general policy model and imposed it on its affiliated party.

The involvement of the union movement in public policy for the working class as a whole requires a rethinking of union-party relationships, in accordance with the political primacy of the union movement. This is desirable, writes Higgins, not only because the union movement is better able to synthesise a class interest, but also because its policy perspective is not limited to short-term electoral considerations. Such policy initiatives make permanent in-house research establishments necessary, as well as the ability to develop policy at arm's length from the government.

As the experience of Africa shows, the nature of the union/party relationship after independence is crucially shaped by the struggles that are fought along the road to liberation. These battles are not yet over in South Africa, but there is evidence to suggest that a new relationship is evolving between the SACP and Cosatu, in which independent and democratic trade unions are seen as an indispensable foundation stone upon which a democratic socialism is built. Such a perspective, given the strategic positions occupied by the SACP and Cosatu within the ANC (especially after the recent national conference), is well-poised to influence a future ANC-led government.

[Boxed item, p 32]

#### Post-Colonial Africa and South Africa

Governing parties in post-colonial Africa, in striving to modernise and rise out of the ashes of underdevelopment, have generally sought to control their countries' trade union movements. Unions have generally been seen as representing a relatively small, privileged class of employed urban workers, amidst a sea of unemployed masses living on a meagre subsistence (Damachi & Fashoyin). They thus faced enormous pressure after independence to play a developmental role (where 'national interests' come first) rather than a representational role (where members' interests are paramount).

South African trade unions have a lot to learn from the experiences of unions in post-colonial Africa. However, the level of industrialisation, as well as the size of the labour movement, makes South Africa a special case on the African continent. In essence, there are three important differences:

Firstly, in contrast to the rest of Africa, where the trade union movement was weak and divided, a future democratic South Africa will inherit a strong, democratic and relatively united trade union movement.



Secondly, whereas in post-colonial Africa the unions were not involved in the struggle for liberation, in South Africa an alliance has been formed between Cosatu and the leading liberation organisation, the ANC.

Thirdly, while in post-colonial Africa narrow nationalism often predominated, South Africa has a long history of class politics through the South African Communist Party, founded in 1921, and the shopfloor tradition that emerged in the 1970s. In addition, various strands of Trotskyism have persisted since the 1930s, particularly in the Western Cape.

Furthermore, the institutional power of the labour movement will narrow the range of options facing any future democratic state in South Africa. Unlike the states of post-colonial Africa, a future South African state will have to accommodate the interests of organised labour at all levels of society. If it resists, it faces a labour movement in opposition to it, with the capacity to develop an alternative (socialist) programme.

Africa has also seen relationships of partnership between unions and the state, or a degree of union independence. This is becoming more common, and recent developments in Zimbabwe (see Pillay, 1991b) and July's Gaborone conference of African trade unions (see Briefings) indicate that unions in Africa are learning from South Africa, and adopting a much more assertive and critical role in their respective countries.

[Boxed item, p 34]

#### 'Stalinism' Persists

While the party has shed much of the baggage of the past, some influential party leaders and rank-and-file activists are still bound by various forms of dogmatic, 'Stalinist' thinking and practices.

For example, central committee member Brian Bunting, until last year editor of the SACP journal *AFRICAN COMMUNIST*, will only go as far as the current Soviet leadership in criticising the former Soviet dictator Josef Stalin.

In the *Learning Nation* (*NEW NATION* 25/590), in response to a Trotskyist interpretation of East European history, he quotes Gorbachev at length, including his view that, while Stalin's political errors and abuses were 'gross', Stalin made an 'incontestable contribution to the struggle for socialism'. Subsequent articles in the *Learning Nation* (*NEW NATION* 15/6/90 and 22/6/90) also reflect thinking which does nothing to dispel the suspicion of critics that the party's new thinking is but a continuation of the old policy of religiously following every 'twist and turn' of Moscow.

Newly-elected ANC NEC [National Executive Committee] member Harry Gwala, a party veteran of almost fifty years, and a member of its Internal Leadership Group (ILG), said recently (*SASPU FOCUS* 1.3, July 1990) that glasnost is part of the natural development of

socialism in Eastern Europe (as opposed to being a response to a severe crisis of such 'socialism'). The lack of democracy and openness of the past 70 years was a result of imperialist aggression, which necessitated a 'highly centralised and organised state machinery'. This implies that the iron fist of Stalin's rule was necessary. Gwala repeated these views publicly on other occasions.

The general secretary of Cosatu's South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (Sactwu), John Copelyn, in the latest *SA LABOUR BULLETIN* (Vol 15, No 8), informs us of a recent example of gross intolerance displayed by another SACP veteran, Raymond Mhlaba, chairperson of the ILG. At a Cosatu Eastern Cape regional congress, Mhlaba curtly told a unionist who raised some difficulties about the functioning of the alliance: 'We have had an alliance for decades. Those who challenge it are mischief makers and need to be brought before a people's court!'

The views of such prominent party leaders raise questions about the extent to which the SACP has completely moved away from, for example, a vanguardist approach to politics, and a 'transmission belt' conception of trade unionism.

[Boxed item, p 36]

#### Capital and the Apartheid State

On the one hand the trade union movement has, over the past year and a half, been engaged in greater mass militancy than previous years, and its leadership has become more sophisticated. On the other hand, the union movement has also, through struggle, improved its relations with sections of capital and the state.

A year ago, Bobby Godsell, negotiator for the employers' federation, Saccola [South African Consultative Council on Labor Affairs], and Anglo-American director, in rejecting notions of a 'subtle conspiratorial alliance' between the state and capital, spoke instead of a 'tactical alliance' between capital and labour against the state over the Labour Relations Amendment Act (LRAA). This was when the state refused to endorse last year's historic Cosatu/Nactu/Saccola (CNS) agreement on changes to the Act (*SA LABOUR BULLETIN*, Vol 15, No 2).

The recent agreements in the mining industry, where the NUM has accepted profit-linked wage increases in a situation of acute crisis, was heralded by big business as a new era in labour relations. Other companies seem to have impressed some of their shopstewards with ideas on 'participative management'. The device of casualised labour allows capital to significantly improve the conditions of work for a section of its workforce, while at the same time denying fundamental workers' rights to a substantial section of 'temporary' workers.

It is thus very possible that a privileged 'labour aristocracy' in certain sectors may be the end-result of the fierce worker struggles for higher wages and better working

conditions over the past decade. This will leave workers in lower-skilled industries, domestic workers, farm-workers and the unemployed at the margins of society. The recent Mercedes Benz sit-in graphically points to tensions of this sort increasing within the union movement (see Von Holdt, 1990).

The attempt to 'de-politicise' labour, an objective of the 1979 Wiehahn Commission, is much more likely to be successful now. This is due to the possibility of a negotiated political settlement in the near future, and the government's seeming willingness in recent months to seriously consider some of the demands of organised labour. Hence the optimism in various circles about the possibilities of a 'social contract' between labour, capital and the state (see SA LABOUR BULLETIN Vol 15, No 6).

Cosatu's then assistant general secretary, Sydney Mafumadi said last September that Cosatu was 'not averse' to the idea of developing the relationship between labour, capital and the state beyond the CNS accord, in the common pursuit of 'organising our society along democratic lines' (IPM JOURNAL, September 1990).

To some extent this can represent the flip side of the movement towards working class hegemony outlined previously. However, labour, and in particular Cosatu, has gone far along the road of politisation which encompasses both the state-political sphere (the demand for democratic government) and the economic sphere (the demand for greater control at the workplace).

While state-political democracy is on the horizon, both the state and capital are very far from giving in to all the demands for greater economic democracy. The workplace can only be 'de-politicised' to a certain extent, but not completely under the conditions of authoritarian capitalism. Although a new style of management, characterised by 'worker participation' rather than direct control and repression, is emerging in some industries, the space for independent decision-making on the part of workers is severely limited (Maller, 1989).

The legacy of authoritarian rule at the workplace will not be easily erased, and a future democratic government is unlikely to satisfy demands for worker control in the early years.

#### Footnotes

1. This is an updated and much shortened version of a paper due to be published in a book arising out of a Harare conference in September 1990, called Ten Years of Zimbabwean Independence: What Lessons for South Africa?

2. Coloured and Indian workers have since the 1920s been allowed to join recognised unions.

3. The differences between the CST thesis and the 'racial capitalism' thesis, which was popular amongst Congress activists in the early 1980s, are on close inspection more semantic than real (see Pillay, 1989).

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#### \* Future of ANC, SACP Relationship Analyzed

91AF1332A Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS  
in English Aug 91 pp 18-19

[Article by Devan Pillay: "Can the SACP Change Track?"—first paragraph is author's introduction]

[Text] Devan Pillay looks at the challenges facing the SACP, and argues that the party either has to become a more independent alliance partner of the ANC [African

National Congress], or dissolve as a party and become an open socialist 'platform' within the ANC.

On 29 July 1991 the South African Communist Party (SACP) celebrated its 70th anniversary. Born in 1921 as the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), the party now faces one of its most challenging periods ever.

It faces enormous pressure, as a legal party emerging from forty years of clandestine struggle, to radically transform itself—but at the same time retain its appeal as a protector and champion of working class interests.

The party hopes to have 30,000 members by December, when it holds its 8th congress. But while the party has made inroads into some areas (such as the mines), its image in other areas has lost a bit of its shine. In Port Elizabeth, for example, the party has virtually no presence—because many activists apparently do not see why they should spend time going to party meetings when they can achieve similar ends through the ANC. In the Border region the party is growing, and still retains much of its appeal. However, apart from the party's more impressive emphasis on political education, party activists in the area are also unsure what it is that makes the party distinct from the ANC. Similar concerns have been expressed in other parts of the country.

#### **Ideological Confusion**

A large measure of this uncertainty about the party's role has to do with a significant degree of ideological confusion within the party at the moment. Having been tied rigidly to the Soviet Union throughout its history, the party is finding it difficult to fully internalise the deep implications of the crisis of 'socialism' in Eastern Europe.

A significant layer within the party retains, to one extent or another, an adherence to 'Stalinist' thinking and practice (see page 34). This goes against two other distinct currents within the party:

Firstly, a (perhaps dominant) current which attempts to recast 'Marxism-Leninism' to make it fit into a revolutionary 'democratic socialist' discourse (see Cronin), thus distancing Leninism from Stalinism.

The second current goes further, and sees Leninist roots in Stalinism. It therefore seeks the abandonment of a 'religious' devotion to Lenin, in the search for a completely transformed socialist project which is drawn heavily from, amongst others, New Left Marxism, feminism, the green movement as well as the experience of social democracy (see for example Steinberg).

But these differences are fluid. The collective mind of the SACP sways backwards and forwards as it tries to comprehend these differences, and forge a realistic yet imaginative path between 'revolutionary vanguardism' on the one hand, and 'reformist capitulation' on the other.

#### **The Alliance**

But the problems facing the SACP cannot be solely reduced to ideological confusions. There are acute practical and strategic difficulties the party has to overcome if its socialist project is to move forward. These relate to the manner in which it operates within its 'revolutionary alliance' with the ANC, in particular the 'multiple hats' dilemma mentioned earlier.

This dilemma, of course, does not arise if the party retains a vanguardist approach to politics, which compels it to seek to direct and control its alliance partners in a secretive, often conspiratorial fashion. But the party as a whole does not want this. It seeks to shape an open, democratic relationship with the ANC and Cosatu [Congress of South African Trade Unions], where it will attempt to influence, rather than conspire to dominate, the direction of the alliance.

The party's objectives revolve around the socialist transformation of South African society. In recent years it has emphasised the link between socialism and democracy, where bureaucratic, commandist methods of transforming society are replaced by more bottom-up, people-empowering methods.

Given the new conditions, the party faces at least three options: it retains and strengthens its current role within and in alliance with the ANC; it becomes a completely independent partner which nevertheless retains the essence of its alliance with the ANC; it dissolves as a party, and reconstitutes itself as an open socialist 'platform' or 'forum' within the ANC.

In considering its present role, the party has two priorities: Firstly, to help prevent the ANC from becoming a 'moderate' (possibly narrow) nationalist political party, which is the desire of the ruling class; and secondly, to assert a distinct democratic socialist perspective within the liberation movement, so as to sow the seeds of eventual socialist transformation.

#### **Maintaining the Status Quo**

The party can opt to maintain the status quo, in the hope that it will derive the best from both worlds—namely retain its long fought-for strategic position within the ANC, while at the same time continue to exist as a separate party. However, it will then have to overcome a perhaps irresolvable tension between developing a distinct, independent role for itself (to justify its separate existence) whilst at the same time not straying too far from the ANC's programme so as to jeopardise the position of communists occupying high office in the ANC.

If all party members are obliged to be active in the ANC, can it develop a distinct identity and programme to convince members, and potential members, that party work should also receive priority?

Some argue that the party's economic programme ought not to differ from the ANC's, because the party agrees



with the ANC's short-to-medium-term (basically social-democratic) programme. But if the party, because of strategic constraints, is unable to project a long-term economic perspective, why then exist as a separate party?

The ANC is sufficiently rooted in the working class (thanks partly to the SACP) for it to eventually be transformed into a socialist party—if that is desirable. The party, however, is acutely aware of the necessity for the ANC to retain its 'broad church' character, at least in the medium term.

The party may very well decide that, as long as the ANC listens to its predominantly working class base, and sticks firmly to crucial democratic demands such as the constituent assembly, then the ground will be sufficiently prepared for thorough-going democratic transformation in the long-term. The party therefore need not divert substantially (if at all) from the path the ANC follows. The party's role, then, is mainly focussed on political education, and keeping a socialist perspective alive (without compromising the ANC in any way).

#### **An Open Socialist 'Platform'**

If so, then why remain as a separate party? An open socialist 'platform' or 'forum' within the ANC, as exists in the British Labour Party, or Brazil's Workers' Party, can perform all the functions of political education and consciousness-raising, without obliging its members to suffer a schizophrenic existence by wearing multiple hats. Such a 'platform', which could be open to any ANC member, and which would operate openly and democratically, could also exist alongside other ANC 'platforms' wishing to popularise, for example, alternative visions of socialism (such as the Marxist Workers' Tendency) [MWT], social democracy or even capitalism.

For this to happen, the right to form platforms must be won in the ANC. And this can only happen if differences, debate and criticism are seen as potentially healthy, and not always divisive and to be buried. If 'platforms' are only allowed if they operate openly, and if members/supporters conduct themselves as disciplined members of the ANC—i.e., they carry out the policies of the organisation as decided by the whole membership—then there is no reason why they should be divisive.

On the contrary, they could forge greater unity, by explicitly acknowledging differences that exist anyway, and allowing them to engage with each other in an atmosphere of tolerance and openness.

#### **More Assertively Independent**

But the SACP may not want to so easily give up its identity as a 70 year-old political party (for maybe emotional reasons?). In addition, the party may feel that a long-term socialist vision needs to be much more assertively projected onto the political arena. As part of sowing the seeds of socialism, the party can play an active role as a watchdog for democracy, both within the liberation movement and at all levels of society.

If so, then the party has to become much more independent of the ANC. It cannot assert itself if its leadership spends most of its time doing 'ANC work', and if it feels bound by the programme of the ANC. An independent SACP need not give up its alliance with the ANC. Indeed, current conditions dictate that such an alliance is necessary and potentially mutually beneficial.

But an alliance does not have to mean inter-locking leaderships. By being more independent, the party can carve its own programme, and engage in activities which have a distinct socialist character. Instead of being locked into the pace at which the ANC, as a government-in-waiting, is forced to operate, the much smaller SACP can concentrate on longer-term strategic planning, and building a cadreship of quality.

As a spin-off benefit, an independent SACP can stake the (red) heat off the ANC (see page 36), allowing the ANC in turn to concentrate much less self-consciously on drawing the widest range of social forces into its ranks.

The danger, of course, exists that the ANC will indeed fall into the hands of 'bourgeois nationalists'. But an 'independent SACP' does not have to mean that none of its members should occupy leadership positions in the ANC. It could adopt a similar position to that of Cosatu vis a vis the ANC, where there is no over-lapping leadership at national level. In addition, the alliance, as a coalition of independent equals, could be strengthened, to the extent that binding decisions are made at alliance meetings.

#### **Difficult Decisions**

These are not easy options for the party. All contain dangers which could seriously derail the struggle for socialism. But these are times for bold, courageous decisions. The party cannot remain as it is. It has to radically transform itself, the way it thinks, and the way it acts, if it wants to fully learn from the mistakes of the past, and take forward a thoroughly transformed, and richer, socialist project.

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**Angola**

**Brazil's Mello Signs Accords, Leaves 10 Sep**

*MB1109143691 Luanda Radio Nacional Network  
in Portuguese 1900 GMT 10 Sep 91*

[Text] A protocol of intentions in educational development was signed in Luanda this afternoon between Angola and Brazil. The accords were signed by Presidents Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola and Fernando Collor de Mello who has already left Luanda for Zimbabwe, the second leg of his African tour.

An Angolan-Brazilian joint declaration issued this afternoon says that the two presidents and their delegations exchanged views on bilateral cooperation and evaluated the international situation in light of the recent profound changes. Specifically, the leaders discussed the Angolan peace process and the prevailing situation in Southern Africa, particularly in South Africa and Mozambique.

Regarding the internal situation in Angola, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos discussed political and socioeconomic issues. He singled out the Bicesse Accords, which, despite a number of incidents, have experienced a positive development, and the government's plan of action to reorganize the national economy.

[Begin unidentified official recording] The sides expressed their profound satisfaction with the development of the largely positive bilateral relations in the political, economic, and trade fields. The two presidents evaluated technical and scientific cooperation between their countries and regarded as very satisfactory the results that have been achieved.

They approved holding the fifth session of the Joint Angolan-Brazilian Commission in Brazil in the first quarter of 1992, at which the delegations of the two countries will assess existing cooperation in the aforementioned areas with a view to better utilize mutual capacities, namely in the field of petroleum.

The sides expressed their profound satisfaction with the excellent development of the Capanda project, the cornerstone of Angolan-Brazilian cooperation, and a clear example that South-South cooperation is viable and tends to bring about a closer and profitable relationship.

In assessing bilateral relations in the field of technical and scientific cooperation, the sides expressed the desire to deepen and develop cultural relations in view of the existing links between the two countries.

The sides carried out a useful exchange of views on environmental issues and agreed on the importance of the international ecological and environmental conference to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. [end recording]

The sides also expressed their satisfaction with the positive results of the talks held during the visit and reiterated the desire to strengthen friendship, solidarity,

and cooperation links between the peoples and Governments of Angola and Brazil.

**Verification Team Tours Quipedro Confinement Area**

*MB1209194291 Luanda Radio Nacional Network  
in Portuguese 1900 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Interview with Brigadier Mackenzie, representative of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola to the Joint Verification and Control Commission, by an unidentified Radio Angola reporter; date and place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] In the area of Quipedro today, a team of senior officials of the countries verifying and observing the implementation of the Angolan peace accords confirmed that 1,173 FALA [Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola] soldiers were confined to that area.

In a short interview with Radio Angola, Brigadier Mackenzie, the second UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] man within the CMVF [Joint Verification and Control Commission], said that conditions have been created for the group of Angolan Government and UNITA observers to be installed in that area.

[Begin recording] [Reporter] Good evening, Brigadier Mackenzie.

[Mackenzie] Good evening.

[Reporter] Brigadier Mackenzie, we have had reports that the helicopter in which you flew to Quipedro actually landed.

[Mackenzie] Affirmative.

[Reporter] Seeing that you went along with U.S., USSR, and Portuguese observers, could you please tell us what was the nature of your CMVF team's work?

[Mackenzie] The Angolan Government was also represented. We went to Quipedro within the framework of the CMVF's mission as agreed on at the meeting of 7 September. That mission included two stages: first we had to go to Funda, and second we had to go to Quipedro. Today we carried out a tour of Quipedro with an Angolan Government team and the observers, who are CMVF members.

[Reporter] Could you tell us whether the FALA soldiers have already been confined to the Quipedro area?

[Mackenzie] Yes they have been confined. We hereby confirm that 1,173 soldiers have been confined.

[Reporter] We have learned that Lieutenant Colonel Ari da Costa, your Angolan Government counterpart within the CMVF, also traveled in that helicopter. Could you tell us why, contrary to what was expected, the government has not installed a team in the area of Quipedro yet?

[Mackenzie] I would like to begin by saying that Lt. Col. Ari is the counterpart of Colonel Arcadio within the framework of the Northern Regional Group. I think it is up to the government to explain why it has not installed its verification team yet. We are willing to receive that

group as long as UNITA has indicated the confinement area. So far, all delays have been blamed on a lack of transportation. That is all we have in the way of information.

[Reporter] Does that mean that conditions have basically been created for the group to start functioning?

[Mackenzie] Yes indeed, so much so that we have even visited the installations where the UNITA, government, and UNAVEM [UN Angola Verification Mission] teams are supposed to be accommodated. As far as we could tell, the government team was satisfied with the installations and with the conditions on the ground.

[Reporter] Thank you very much, Brig. Mackenzie. Good night.

[Mackenzie] Thank you. [end recording]

### Mozambique

#### Brazilian President Arrives in Maputo 12 Sep

MB1209113891 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1045 GMT 12 Sep 91

[Excerpts] Fernando Collor de Mello, president of the Federative Republic of Brazil, arrived in Maputo at about 1200 [1000 GMT] today for a two-day official visit to Mozambique. Collor de Mello was received at the Maputo International Airport by Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano, the Republic's Assembly Chairman Marcelino dos Santos, members of the Political Commission and the Council of Ministers, as well as hundreds of Maputo residents. Collor de Mello is accompanied by an important delegation which includes Foreign Minister Francisco Rezek. [passage omitted]

The two countries' statesmen are expected to begin talks this afternoon to discuss a number of issues of common interest. This evening, Collor de Mello will be honored with a state banquet hosted by President Joaquim Chissano.

#### Banquet for Brazilian President

MB1309064991 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 0500 GMT 13 Sep 91

[Text] President Joaquim Chissano said in Maputo yesterday that there are currently about 3 million war-displaced Mozambicans both inside the country and in neighboring countries. Speaking at a banquet in honor of his Brazilian counterpart Collor de Mello who is visiting Mozambique, Chissano said the war has not only hindered internal development programs but also regional projects.

He said there is an urgent need to obtain peace in Mozambique. For this reason, he added, the Mozambican Government is determined to continue to undertake efforts with a view to ending violence and restoring peace in the country.

In turn, the Brazilian president expressed the desire to see an agreement reached between the conflicting sides,

thus enabling Mozambique to move firmly toward peace, democracy, and progress.

Referring to cooperation between Mozambique and Brazil, Collor de Mello said his country gives great importance to its participation in the Moatize coal project. He also said his country wants to strengthen cooperative relations with Mozambique in all fields.

#### Brazilian President Ends Visit

MB1309130691 Maputo Radio Maputo in English 1100 GMT 13 Sep 91

[Text] Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello has ended his 24-hour visit to Mozambique. During his stay, President Collor de Mello held talks with President Chissano.

A communique published at the end of the visit says that the two sides analyzed the present development stage of the Moatize coal project in Mozambique's northern [as heard] province of Tete. They said there is a need to stimulate enterprises in both countries in order to get support from financial institutions and international cooperation aimed at materializing the final study of the viability of the Moatize coal project.

Concerning the situation in Mozambique, the document says that President Chissano discussed with the Brazilian president political, social, and economic matters.

President Chissano also spoke about the Rome peace talks, saying that they are within the framework of the Mozambican Government efforts to achieve peace in the country.

During a state banquet last night, President Chissano decorated President Collor de Mello with Mozambique's Order of Friendship and Peace. President Collor de Mello has left Maputo for Namibia, the last stage of his African tour.

#### Envoy Discusses Diplomatic Changes in USSR

MB1109173891 Maputo Radio Mozambique Network in Portuguese 1100 GMT 11 Sep 91

[Report on news conference by Soviet Ambassador to Mozambique Vladimir Korneyev in Maputo on 10 September in English]

[Text] The dramatic changes in the Soviet Union are having effects all over the world. Here in Mozambique, Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Korneyev talked to journalists yesterday about the current situation in his country and also answered questions about the international implications of current events. [Words indistinct] the questions which he answered at the same time involved two countries with which Moscow has long-standing friendly relations: Mozambique and Cuba.

The reporters wanted to know: first, will the 20-year Treaty of Friendship between the Soviet Union and



Mozambique be affected; second, what was the meaning of last week's remarks by the Soviet foreign minister that Moscow would be reviewing its cooperation with Cuba; and third, would the changes in the Soviet Union affect Soviet military cooperation with Mozambique? Ambassador Korneyev:

[Begin Korneyev recording] Now as far as the Soviet-Mozambique treaty is concerned, the question here lies with the statements that the Soviet Union will observe all the treaties, international and bilateral, which have been concluded before. So that is the answer to this question.

As far as the concrete question that you have asked me about, Cuba, I, unfortunately, cannot substantiate on what the new minister of foreign affairs said, but I believe that it refers to the practical matters in our bilateral relations with Cuba, primarily the economic sphere.

Now, the military cooperation of the Soviet Union with foreign countries: During our first meetings that we have had here sometime back there was some question to this effect, and I believe our stand remains the following: We have and we are determined to optimize our relations with foreign countries in practically all the fields, including the military one. [end recording]

But the changes in the Soviet Union could imply other changes abroad. For example, did Ambassador Korneyev think that the new (rules) of Soviet federation could mean that in future he might not be the only ambassador in Maputo from the old Soviet Union territory? Could there be ambassadors from the Ukraine or from Georgia, for example?

[Begin Korneyev recording] First of all I can envisage the possibility of having here the ambassadors of three Baltic republics, and maybe more of the republics that will decide to quit the union, or rather not to join the future union. Well, in other words, it will all depend on how the creation of the new unions goes on. [end recording]

Journalists also wanted Ambassador Korneyev to speculate about the future of a big new Soviet diplomatic complex under construction in Maputo. Works on the complex, which appropriately enough are situated in Vladimir Lenin Avenue, is well under way. But what would its future be?

[Begin Korneyev recording] As far as the complex being constructed in Avenida [preceding word in Portuguese] Lenin, I would like to comment that this is not the embassy compound; this is the trade mission compound. Well, the embassy personnel will be occupying only one apartment building there so at present we don't have any plans to move the embassy there because at present it's being constructed by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. [end recording]

## Zimbabwe

### Brazilian President Holds Talks With Mugabe

MB1109193891 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1929 GMT 11 Sep 91

[Text] Harare Sept 11 SAPA—Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello laid a wreath at the tomb of the unknown soldier in Zimbabwe on Wednesday morning, paying homage to Zimbabweans who fell in the war for independence. The ZIANA National News Agency reported President de Mello, on a three-day visit, was scheduled to hold talks with President Robert Mugabe later on Wednesday. The talks are expected to touch on bilateral, regional and international issues. The Brazilian leaves on Thursday.

### Discusses Trade, Cooperation

MB1209083491 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
0114 GMT 12 Sep 91

[Text] Harare Sept 11 SAPA—Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello discussed the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and the peace process in Portuguese-speaking Mozambique and Angola with President Robert Mugabe and top Zimbabwean Government officials on Wednesday. ZIANA news agency said improved trade and cooperation with Brazil featured high on the agenda, which also included other regional and international issues.

Mr Collor de Mello, who is on a four-nation African tour, has visited Angola and is expected to visit Mozambique and Namibia after leaving Zimbabwe on Thursday. Brazil wanted to improve ties with developing nations, particularly African nations, Brazil's Foreign Affairs Minister Francisco Rezek said. Brazil and Zimbabwe were also expected to sign technical and co-operation agreements during the visit.

Mr Rezek said despite Zimbabwe being the second largest industrial base after Nigeria, excluding South Africa, bilateral trade between the two countries was only USD1 million a year. Zimbabwe's delegation to the talks—which were closed to the press—included Vice-President Joshua Nkomo and other top government ministers.

### Mozambique Expected To Request Troop Withdrawal

MB1209155691 Johannesburg Radio RSA in English  
1500 GMT 12 Sep 91

[Text] Official sources in Harare say they expect the Mozambican Government to raise the question of the withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from Mozambique soon. The Mozambican Minister of Transport Armando Guebuza, who is also chief negotiator in peace talks with the Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] movement, is in Harare at the moment to brief the Zimbabwean Government on the progress of the peace process. He is expected to discuss the possible withdrawal of Zimbabwean troops from Mozambique before returning home on Saturday. Zimbabwe has deployed about 7,000 troops to guard the Beira Corridor which links Zimbabwe to the Indian Ocean, and the purpose is to guard against attacks by the Renamo movement.

## Ivory Coast

### Prime Minister's News Conference Reported

AB1209171591 Abidjan FRATERNITE MATIN  
in French 12 Sep 91 pp 11-15

[News conference by Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara with the national and international press in Abidjan on 11 September]

[Excerpts] [Assi] Amedee Assi, IVOIR'SOIR: Mr. Prime Minister, the opposition and some newspapers assert that your economic plan has failed, and yet you announced a few months ago while addressing the parliament that the stabilization phase had been completed. What is the true situation today? Mr. Prime Minister, can you now present a detailed balance sheet on our country's economic health?

[Ouattara] Thank you. I can say right away that the government's plan has not failed, and I think that there are very concrete signs to prove my assertion. First, you can recall that in May 1990, we proposed to our countrymen and then later to the international community a series of measures aimed at stopping economic deterioration. The measures contained in that plan were difficult ones, but they were accepted by the people and approved by the international community. We have received huge disbursements. The threat of a reduction of salaries that we were facing no longer exists. Of course, a few people lost their jobs as a result of the reorganization of the economic situation. We took to heart the social aspects of this program and we implemented a series of measures like reducing textbook prices, addressing the problem of hospital drugs, subsidies [intrants], etc. Therefore, several things have been achieved and I believe have been appreciated by the people. So this plan has not failed. We started the second phase of the plan in 1991. I said that this needed some stabilization and this has been achieved. I will add that in spite of the difficulties in 1990, the government's recurrent budget, which had recorded a deficit of more than 100 billion CFA francs—130 billion to be precise—in 1989, improved and recorded a surplus of about 44 billion CFA francs in 1990. It is on the basis of these statistics that we must assess the success or failure of the plan. From a deficit we rose to a surplus.

Second, the economic threats have subsided and the situation is getting better. At that time we also had the banking system problem. You can recall that in December 1989 one could not cash a check in any bank. One had to line up for several hours; all this has now disappeared. When the head of state asked me to propose a cabinet for 1991, I did it at the end of November (1990) as the ministers needed some time to restructure their various ministries. I thought it was necessary to immediately launch a restructuring of the administrative machinery in order to make it more efficient. This has

been achieved and at a news conference on 21 February 1991, I was able to give you the details of this restructuring. [passage omitted]

A few weeks ago, we mapped out a medium-term macroeconomic program that will cover the period between 1991 and 1995. The details of this program will be proposed to the National Assembly when it resumes its sessions in October. So ladies and gentlemen, I do not know what you are calling a failure. I can tell you that there have been no salary cuts and there will be no salary cuts. During all these negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions and the friendly countries, I pointed out that there are certain issues that are not negotiable. As far as I am concerned, the message is very clear. Now it is my wish that there will be a lasting social peace to enable us to implement this medium-term program in an efficient and productive manner. I think this is important. On our balance sheet, I will say in short that our economy is doing better than it was a year or two ago. It will continue to do better. [passage omitted]

[Maixent] Denis Maixent of Ivorian Television Channel 1. Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to touch on one special and sensitive aspect of the Ivorian education system, namely the university. I am not going to talk about the several problems of structures or infrastructures that are real. I would rather touch on the development of the recent relationship between the administration, the lecturers, and the students. The university reopened on 9 September and we heaved a sigh of relief, but it seems that there are a few problems, we must say. The lecturers say they have not received their salaries. The students affirmed that some of their colleagues are still being detained. Therefore, all the conditions have not been met for an effective resumption, or at least for a lasting peace to be restored to the university. We should not, however, jump to a hasty conclusion. What is exactly the situation, Mr. Prime Minister?

[Ouattara] Thank you. As I said a while ago, classes have resumed at the university in order to complete the 1990-1991 academic year. For the past two days, things have been normal, but you are right in pointing out that there are some issues still being discussed. This situation is a changing one. When I decided to requisition the lecturers, I clearly told the nation of my simple view that one should be paid for his work and that when one did not work, he should not be paid. Therefore, I simply applied these very simple notions. When some secondary school teachers who were on strike decided to resume work, they were paid, but only for the time during which they actually worked. This is what is happening at the level of the university. Concerning the detained students issue, for goodness' sake, let us not confuse tasks. We have the executive arm of the government, but there is also the judiciary. Some students—I think there are now many—have been detained. They were caught red-handed in a murder case. Justice will take its course. The government must not interfere with the judiciary. I strongly believe in the separation of powers. [passage omitted]

[Huband] Mark Huband from THE GUARDIAN, London. Mr. Prime Minister, thank you very much for this news conference and I hope there will be more to come. Following the resumption of violence in the northwest of Liberia, do you continue to have confidence in the Liberian Army and in the countries that have been playing a military role in Liberia?

[Ouattara] Well listen, the Liberian problem is an important one for us because first it is an African country ravaged by war, but in particular it is a neighboring country. I believe that the initiatives taken recently by the head of state only go to prove our interest in finding a rapid solution to that crisis in Liberia, but you are aware that all over the world negotiations are difficult. They take time. You may recall the case of the Gulf war. After all difficulties, Secretary Baker is now making his seventh or eighth round of talks in search for peace in that region. Therefore, when one is seeking peace, one must be patient. We shall take all our time to achieve peace in Liberia, but this must be done as soon as possible because we do not want to see our Liberian brothers dying every day because of this fratricidal war.

[Boa] Roger Boa of TV2. Mr. Prime Minister, it seems many of the measures you announced in your plan have not yet been implemented—for example, revamping the financial sector, actually restructuring the Abidjan Stock Exchange, and the early retirement scheme which Ivoirians are impatiently waiting for. Furthermore, the BNDA [National Agricultural Development Bank] affects many businesses in a country in which 80 percent of the population is involved in the agricultural. What is the fate of the BNDA? Is it going to be liquidated or is it going to be reorganized to make it stronger?

Mr. Prime Minister, the price of gasoline in Ivory Coast is among the highest in Africa. Do you have any plans to alleviate this burden on Ivoirians as this tolls heavily on their income?

Finally, today, after 15 months of implementing the stabilization plan, when will the economic revival policy be capable of creating wealth?

[Ouattara] Concerning the financial sector, I did not want to dwell too much on the economic issue. I have pointed out that we have had negotiations, sometimes very difficult, with the IMF and the World Bank on the 1991 economic program. These negotiations ended successfully, and the IMF will examine the financial program this very month. Concerning the World Bank, I also pointed out that we negotiated a medium-term economic program which will cover the period 1991-1995. Apart from these macroeconomic, therefore comprehensive, programs, in the last few weeks or few months we have also negotiated for loans for several sectors. Perhaps you can recall that last year these loans were for the agricultural, electricity, forestry, and other sectors. This year, one of the most important sector loans negotiated is the financial sector structural plan.

You are right to point it out; it is a very important element. The banking system should work well so that economic activities will flow smoothly. These negotiations were not easy because we had several banks go bankrupt and close down. For the remaining banks, we want to restructure and fund them so that we do not repeat the problems we experienced in 1989. This financial sector loan has reached its final negotiation phase as my economic adviser, Jean-Claude Brou, returned from Washington and the docket has been finalized. The World Bank will examine it in October, and the disbursement will be for the banking system. [passage omitted]

We have already discussed all the problems concerning primary and secondary school education, and I plan to make a statement on this issue by the end of the month. We are now looking into the university problems. We have sent missions to Morocco, Zimbabwe, France, Germany, and even Canada, to see how their universities function because we are convinced that our university education should be reformed. We should spend less on salaries and no longer dwell so much on investment but rather on the quality of equipment so that our youth will be better trained and receive quality education. All these projects have been set in motion.

The third sectorial aspect on which we have been working is competitiveness: how to improve our economic competitiveness; how to export more; and how to diversify from cocoa and coffee. [passage omitted]

So when is the economic revival coming? In our opinion, the revival has already begun. Stabilization was achieved in 1990, and 1991 is a year for the economic revival program to take off, but the revival calls for a number of conditions. It is all about what I have just mentioned to you: that all sectorial programs should be implemented, that we develop a sense of saving—not only by the government and the public sector but the entire population because it is with savings that investments are made and investment conditions are created for all, both nationals and foreigners. This calls for social peace. Ivory Coast should be perceived as a country of peace and democracy; a country where there is no arbitrariness; where a person's property is not seized without proper court judgment after having invested here for many years. All these things are being worked on, and we shall be briefing you periodically. I want to stress that the government is not the prime minister alone; the ministers will also give news conferences. I promise you. [passage omitted]

What will be the fate of the BNDA? The BNDA is a bank in a state of bankruptcy. Excuse me for being so blunt. It is a bank with very little sound credit. I do not think there is more than 5 to 6 billion CFA francs in sound credit for a portfolio of over 70 or 80 billion, which is what is required for restructuring.

We are currently holding discussions with other organizations and even with some credit institutions on how best we could be helped to find a solution for the BNDA.



This is no easy task. There have been a couple of voluntary retirements financed by ourselves and the Central Fund for Economic Cooperation. This is an institution that failed because instead of concentrating on the small farmer, it embarked on too many gigantic operations which, in the final analysis, led to a good proportion of its assets being frozen.

It is a bank which is not functioning properly, and it is the government's duty to assume its responsibility and find the best possible solutions. Our aim, however, is to provide safeguards for the rural community, particularly the small depositor by ensuring that there is a financial transition in the rural area and that, consequently, the farmers have access to specialized credit institutions where they can make deposits, obtain credit, withdraw monies, etc. This is therefore a matter to be pursued.

[Sidibe] Ladjé Sidibe, FRATERNITE MATIN. Mr. Prime Minister, despite the efforts you depicted a short while ago, Ivorians are still feeling the pinch of the crisis: freezing of salaries, sharp increase of direct and indirect taxes, and above all escalation of prices of basic food-stuffs. First one notices that the local milk producers, for instance, have embarked on price increases which look like a sort of provocation to the consumer. The SICTA [Ivorian Automobile Technical Controls Company], as soon as it was privatized, began to lay off workers and then to increase its rates in a virtually unjustified manner. Then rice bought cheaply is resold in the big towns at 175 CFA francs and in Abidjan at 250 CFA francs per kilo. Locally manufactured sugar is sold at 300 CFA francs a packet to offset overinvoicing errors. Now, imported sugar has appeared on the market and is being sold at the same price. The consumer feels forsaken, Mr. Prime Minister.

Second question: Ivory Coast, under your policy, seeks to save as much as possible by cutting down on expenditure sectors, which is praiseworthy. Yet, at the General Directorate of Public Works, for example, there are no less than 200 senior executives—all European technical assistants—who, understandably, indulge in a policy of obstructing any meaningful Ivorianization of executive positions.

This enterprise, which has been placed under your authority, expects far-reaching changes. When will such changes be forthcoming?

[Ouattara] Regarding the salaries, what really impresses me is that as human beings we tend somehow to have short memories. A year ago, we were all concerned about the reduction of our salaries. We were able to avoid that, and now people are talking about an increase in salaries. You know that there are no miracles. You cannot increase salaries if you do not have the necessary resources. Or do you want us to double salaries and double inflation?

In that case, we find ourselves back to square one or even beyond in the case of the poorest classes. So, gentlemen of the press, you have a duty to educate our people. We

definitely have to be able to explain to them that one can give only what he has. As for me, I cannot go and borrow to increase salaries.

You know, there are certain countries which have salary arrears to pay. They thought they were doing well by going around everywhere and saying: Help us. We need to catch up on salary arrears, and what were they told in reply? The industrialized countries said: The question of salaries is your business; that is your problem, and not the problem of France, Germany, or any other country.

Let us therefore learn to count on ourselves. I think that is very important. We can only spend what we generate. The economic situation is an unfavorable one. We have been able, through these spending cuts, to pay salaries, and we are no longer worried over the payment of salaries. Every month—the finance minister is here to bail me out—we discuss the cash position weekly, and it is no longer a source of worry.

We know that the salaries will be paid and that some money will be left for tackling a number of essential expenses: supplies, etc. Surely, that is what economic management is all about. Later we will have a little more money to make investments. Thereafter, we will have a little more money for welfare matters, but in the meantime, we have to exercise caution. We must not fall into the never-ending cycle of inflation which marks a point of no return. Have no doubt about it: I myself am pestered by nephews, cousins, uncles, and other relatives who keep telling me: "There is no money; things are pretty tough." I tell them that unfortunately, that is the situation of our country. As a result of the disastrous fall in the price of our raw materials, we have become poor.

It is like a household that has four or five people working and which, all of a sudden, sees the number of its salaried members reduced by half, along with its resources. I think that you must help us to put the point across: It is certainly a painful situation, but things are certainly going to change.

The prices are at their lowest, but we are managing our affairs according to our resources. If there is an improvement, if there is a diversification of our economy, the impact will automatically be felt.

On taxes and other issues, I would not like to go into detail. I can assure you, however, that some steps have been taken. You read in a recent Council of Ministers report that the Ministry of Finance has initiated a special exercise concerning unpaid taxes, in particular, and I can assure you that we will go much further in the area of property tax, for instance. In this regard, I would like to forewarn people. For goodness sake, pay your taxes because all those with water meters in their homes will be assigned taxpayers' account numbers.

Everyone will be caught. It is an exercise that will take off very fast. I maintain that a good citizen is one who pays his taxes, so for goodness sake, let us all show that we are good citizens because it is not normal to have a portion

of the population avoiding taxes forever. Let me assure you that this tax collection exercise will begin in Cocody. We have taken stock of all the meters in Cocody. The meters will enable us to conduct a survey of taxpayers' account numbers, and if by any chance anyone happens not to have a taxpayer's account number, he will be asked to explain why and made to settle his taxes pretty fast. [passage omitted]

[El Bou] Mohamed El Bou (Voice of America). Mr. Prime Minister, we recently heard that the state had enough savings to clear part of its internal debt. What is the exact situation?

[Ouattara] Indeed we have started paying off part of the internal debt. It is not substantial enough, but it is in clearing the internal debt that we can revive the economic machinery. We started off in 1990 with a number of priorities, and at the end of 1990 and early 1991 we decided that it was necessary to lay emphasis on official houses.

In the past, for example, the poor policemen were thrown out of the premises supplied to them by government because they had not been paid for. The same holds for the customs and excise officers, gendarmes, and soldiers. Today we pay rent for premises hired by the government at the same time that we pay salaries. We have also decided that small- and medium-scale enterprises should be a priority in the payment of the internal debt, so each time we have resources, we try to put a certain sum aside for small- and medium-scale enterprises.

Of course all this is recent and the effect cannot be felt immediately, but it is a step in the right direction, and the minister of finance is ensuring that this is done in all the desired conditions of clarity. The internal debt is really a burden on our economy; it worries me more than the foreign debt because there is always a solution for the foreign debt. A financier is aware that rescheduling, discounts, etc. are commonplace. We have all kinds of financial techniques for settling foreign debts, but when it comes to internal debt, it can only be settled when it has been paid. In order for it to be paid, resources are needed, and we are working toward that. [passage omitted]

[Aboubakar] Diaby Aboubakar (L'UNION newspaper). Mr. Prime Minister, I am going back a little to talk about stabilization. You said that the framework was macro-economic and therefore global. In regard to recovery, the state is entering the surplus phase and yet enterprises are, unfortunately, in difficulty as though the state were enriching itself at their expense. The basic problem today is that of employment, and as the minister of labor has said, 56,000 jobs are envisaged over the next three years. Enterprises are currently faced with a situation where prices are still high, so will the recovery envisaged for 1991-1992 not be jeopardized?

Economies currently depend on trust within the business sector, and, let us face it, many Ivorians are asking

questions. In the area of privatization and housing, some enlightenment is necessary to enable Ivorians to regain confidence in their prime minister. These budding doubts are aggravated by insecurity. The other day, at the International Bank of West African States, I met a businessman who was there to close his accounts because he had been attacked several times.

[Ouattara] The minister of interior and security spoke to you about security a few days ago. It is a government priority. I do not wish to repeat what he has already said. We have set up the structures; we have provided the means; we also have a meeting every Tuesday on security. These meetings can last from between one to three hours. At these meetings, we review strategy and give instructions to the police prefect. It is an issue that we are keenly following. We have graphs showing an improvement in the situation over the past few weeks, but that is not enough because even when everything is going on well, all one needs is for a neighbor's car to be stolen and the people say: "All is lost." We are concerned about this issue and we are not looking on unconcerned. We continue to make efforts in this area. Now should that lead to a state of panic?

Trust, I agree, goes hand in hand with security. Investors will not come if they believe there is a climate of insecurity here. In this regard, we are determined to go as far as possible to uproot the problem of insecurity which we have been experiencing in the past months. The problem of trust, as you said, implies trust in the government, trust in the leaders. This trust is vital; that is why I decided to sue the papers that attempted to soil my reputation. If the outside world believes that the prime minister is dishonest, that he is engaged in dubious financial operations linked to his privatization policy, the cornerstone of his revival program, then we might as well say goodbye to investors. [passage omitted]

We must concentrate on the need to attain our objectives. Each one of us should consider himself on a mission, and I would like us to fulfill these missions in a peaceful and serene atmosphere. We have experienced moments of unrest; we saw the effects on tax and customs earnings. Let us try to see how marches grind the nation to a halt and disrupt the economic machinery. Let us try to continue expressing our differences in a peaceful manner bearing in mind that it is only through hard work that we will be able to emerge from this crisis. Thank you.

## Liberia

**Sawyer, Taylor To Meet in Yamoussoukro**  
AB1209155791 Paris AFP in English 1540 GMT  
12 Sep 91

[Text] Lagos, Sept 12 (AFP)—The president of Liberia's interim government and the leader of the country's main rebel group are to hold talks at the weekend in Yamoussoukro, the Ivorian political capital, an official source in

the ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] secretariat said here Thursday [12 September]. The talks between Professor Amos Sawyer and rebel leader Charles Taylor will take place ahead of a mini-summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) due to open in the same city Monday. Taylor, head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), has previously refused to recognise Sawyer's authority as interim president.

The weekend meeting would enable the two opposing parties to "iron out areas of differences" between them before the summit of the committee of five nations charged with the responsibility of disarming the warring factions and preparing Liberia for democratic elections, the source told AFP.

The committee, constituted during the last June ECOWAS summit in Abuja, Nigeria's future capital, is made up of heads of state of Ivory Coast, Togo, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau and Ivory Coast. Nigeria, whose president, General Ibrahim Babangida, is current OAU (Organisation of African Unity) chairman, has been invited to attend the summit, expected to last for two days, the source said. It is likely that ECOWAS authorities may have also invited Guinea and Sierra Leone, two nations that have contributed troops to the ECOWAS peace-keeping force in Liberia, the source said.

#### **Nigerian General Remarks on ECOMOG Progress**

*AB1009214091 Paris AFP in English 1840 GMT  
10 Sep 91*

[Text] Monrovia, Sept 10 (AFP)—Liberia's peace process has been "painfully slow but is still on course," the commander of a West African force said here Tuesday, exactly a year after the late President Samuel Doe was tortured to death by rebels.

Nigerian General Rufus Kupulati told a press conference that he was confident that a new peace conference Monday [9 September] grouping West African leaders in the Ivory Coast political capital Yamoussoukro would come out with a "definite decision" breaking the country's political deadlock.

On achievements during his seven months as commander of ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group], the force sent to Liberia in August 1990 by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), he said he had "tried to maintain the ceasefire" which came into effect last November.

He dismissed charges that he was slow in fully implementing ceasefire modalities including the opening of roads as unfair. "Soldiers do not decide to go to war. This is a political decision," he said.

Kupulati could not say how long ECOMOG would remain in Liberia, adding that the countries contributing

troops—Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea and the Gambia—would have to decide.

Main rebel Charles Taylor has asked that troops from other West African countries—such as Senegal, Burkina Faso, Togo and Mali—join the force to make it acceptable for him to disarm.

Kupulati said the peacekeeping mission was "a very, very expensive operation" without saying how much it had cost so far. The commander said all material, equipment and food had been brought in from outside Liberia.

Kupulati also refused to disclose the size of the force, saying it was "a military secret." ECOMOG sources earlier put the size of the force at the height of the conflict at 6,000, while independent sources said 7,000.

### **Nigeria**

#### **Commentary on Outcome of Dan Quayle's Visit**

*AB1309104591 Lagos Voice of Nigeria in English  
1030 GMT 12 Sep 91*

[Mohamed Okorejo commentary]

[Text] The visit of Mr. Dan Quayle, the American vice president, to Nigeria turned out to be an eye-opener. If nothing else, it succeeded in bringing Nigeria down from her dream of an American prosperity in terms of concrete aid and other concessions. The American second citizen [as heard] told his disappointed Nigerian audience that there can be no question of special favor to Nigeria in the payment of her debts such as outright cancellation. He stressed that debts must be paid off and that the only respite for Nigeria is debt rescheduling which Washington has often done.

Dan Quayle's reason is that Nigeria is a potentially rich nation and should work hard at her economy. Dan Quayle's stand is a satire on the profligacy of our past administrations that seemed to have made little or no effort to manage the vast resources of the nation judiciously.

Pointedly, Washington's stand means that Lagos cannot hope, at least for now, to enjoy the status of most favored nation with the American Government. In taking this position, America is only telling Nigeria to look inward and help herself, which is what the Structural Adjustment Program [SAP], introduced since 1986, is all about.

Since the introduction of SAP, the Nigerian economy has gradually showed some improvement because Nigerians have moved from their passive to participatory roles. Local raw materials have also found favor with Nigerian industrial ventures and this checks the drain on foreign reserves.

There may be a tendency for some Nigerians to see the American stand as punitive, more so when Nigeria has



not often taken stands blindly with Western aspirations but the truth is that America is only being very American. It is not on record that Washington gives out aid and other concessions without considering the advantages derivable from such a gesture. Washington strongly believes in reciprocity. This explains the sudden change of heart by Washington in its outright cancellation of all debts owed by Egypt because of Cairo's role in the recent Gulf War.

Incidentally, Washington does not believe that Nigeria has done enough to win the kind of confidence that warrants special favors. It is sad because America is not just sounding off. With the demise of USSR, which hitherto provided an alternative economic ally in times of dire need, Washington can now afford to call the bluff of any nation.

But Nigeria does not want to be a beggar nation and does not want to depend on others all the time. As a developing nation that is faced with several setbacks and hardships, it will take time to break even. If Nigeria needs aid, it is to help her to be on course until her various investments, which have greatly increased since the Babangida administration, start to yield dividends.

Besides, there is a new initiative by individuals and the private sector in Nigeria and their counterparts in America to pool resources in joint ventures. The Nigeria-America Chamber of Commerce is working hard and is achieving positive results.

Incidentally, in Dan Quayle's entourage were representatives of some highly capitalized companies in America who are ready to do business in Nigeria. The president of the chamber, Mr. Julius Adeluyi Adelusi, said the inclusion of industrialists on Dan Quayle's team is a manifestation of the desire by both countries to improve their relations through mutually rewarding business.

On the Liberian situation, it is apparent that America wants to give the ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African State's Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] initiative a chance to succeed. It is only on the South African problem that Dan Quayle was not very open. He merely said that America was working towards bringing down apartheid, but one is tempted to wonder if America's action in hurriedly lifting economic sanctions against Pretoria does not amount to rejuvenating rather than bringing down apartheid. Also, that declaration cannot be enough from a nation that prides itself as the world's champion of democracy and repository of human rights. Africa wants to believe that Washington's action in this regard was taken in error and will be

corrected now that the vice president has come to Africa and has a correct perspective of the situation.

Whichever way one looks at it, Dan Quayle's visit to Nigeria has been quite rewarding. At least Nigeria got aid worth \$2 million for her political transition efforts. The gesture is understandable because Washington wants to see democracy in place everywhere. What is not understandable is the paucity of the fund for such a noble objective. However, the visit enabled America and Nigeria to put views on world issues in correct perspective and leave no one in doubt as to what to expect.

### Sierra Leone

**Development, Planning Minister Leaving Government**  
*AB1109220391 London BBC World Service in English  
1705 GMT 11 Sep 91*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] President Momoh of Sierra Leone is expected to promulgate a multiparty constitution and appoint an interim government in the next few days, but one man who will not be in it is Dr. Sheka Kanu, minister of national development and economic planning. He is leaving the government—the third senior minister to go since July—this week, but Sheka Kanu is raising questions about the circumstances of his sudden departure from office. From Freetown journalist Kleins Roy McCauley telexed this report:

[Begin studio announcer recording] President Momoh yesterday relieved Dr. Sheka Kanu of his duties as minister of national development and economic planning. No official reason was given for the dismissal on government-controlled radio. An announcement late last night said that President Momoh himself would take over Dr. Kanu's portfolio until further notice. It also said that Dr. Kanu had been stripped of his post as the acting chairman of the Po local district of the ruling All People's Congress, or APC Party, following a meeting at the weekend when a vote of no confidence had been passed on him.

But in an interview with me this morning, Dr. Kanu told me that: The decision to relieve me of my ministerial appointment was a sort of preemptive strike, since I had already served notice to President Momoh yesterday morning that I would be leaving the government party. Dr. Sheka Kanu said that he had become disgruntled with the running of the party. His future plans are unknown and he did not say which of the opposition parties he intended to join. [end recording]

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